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Abstract 
 
 
The 21st century has witnessed an increased focus on the cultivation and propagation of soft 
power by the Indian government. Along with cultural soft power, the soft power of political 
values, ideals, and identities has also featured within this exercise, but is often overlooked. This 
thesis is anchored in the international appeal of the rare and hybrid nature of India’s political 
identity, i.e. that of a post-colonial country with a robust and dynamic democracy, and its 
significance as an important soft power resource for the South Asian country. In this thesis, I 
draw on theories of critical constructivism and post-colonialism to propose that India’s soft 
power strategy for a particular foreign state is influenced by the colonial history of that state. 
Comprehensive examination of extensive data is carried out through a comparative case study 
using the methods of qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis. Consequently, this 
thesis reveals that India is likely to use the democratic aspect of its political identity in bilateral 
relations with ex-colonizer countries and it is likely to use the post-colonial aspect of its political 
identity in bilateral relations with ex-colony countries.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1     India’s Soft Power: Unique political appeal 
 
On 20th November 2017, a historic, albeit globally minor, diplomatic incident took place when 
India’s nominee to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was re-elected in place of the nominee 
of the United Kingdom (UK), which decided to bow out of the contest after eleven inconclusive 
rounds of voting. Consequently, for the first time in the history of the United Nations (UN), the 
UK is not on the ICJ, and this is also the first time that a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) lost out to an ordinary UN member for a seat at The Hague (George, 2017). 
Backed by around two-thirds of the members of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), India’s 
diplomatic outreach to fellow developing nations bore fruit when the UK withdrew its candidate, 
citing the hope of continued cooperation with “close friend” India (Pant, 2017). While also 
somewhat symbolic of Britain’s post-Brexit reality, this incident has renewed the focus on 
India’s political influence and leadership amongst the developing and post-colonial world. At the 
same time, the UK’s decision to opt out and its rhetoric of friendship points to a desire for good 
political relations with India. Can this be seen as a sign of India’s political soft power for both 
the developing world and an advanced country such as the UK? 
Recently, in light of the prevailing economic interdependence and institutional multilateralism, 
soft power, i.e. the influencing power of culture, values, and policies, has risen in focus. This is 
particularly true for India and China, the two largest emerging economies that frequently attempt 
to exercise soft power for achieving greater political sway, and often elicit comparison. China 
has emerged as a global power, but one that is seen as threatening the established normative 
international order, with much skepticism about its ‘peaceful rise’. India, on the other hand, for 
many across the developed and developing world, is a benign and more reasonable emerging 
power, one aiming to work within the established order, albeit with a view to making it more 
equitable. China’s greater economic prowess and military muscle make it more powerful in a 
traditional sense, in the neighbourhood and beyond. Both nations are inheritors of ancient 
civilizations and rich cultural heritage, but China invests more heavily in public diplomacy and 
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soft power propagation. What truly sets Indian soft power apart from that of China, and also 
other emerging powers, is its polity, i.e. its pluralistic values and post-independence democratic 
institutions. The international coherence of India’s dynamic political system eclipses that of its 
larger neighbour China, a communist state with political centralism. Moreover, China’s 
permanent UNSC status alienates most of the developing nations that demand an increased say in 
global decision-making. Reflecting on these facets, Christian Wagner remarked in 2010 (p.334), 
“Compared to China, India looks like a soft power by default”. As Joseph Nye (1990) argued, 
more attractive countries are those that help to frame issues, whose culture and ideas are close to 
prevailing global norms, and whose credibility abroad is reinforced by their values and policies.  
In a world where most advanced economies are democracies and the vast majority of the 
developing nations once endured colonial rule, India’s political identity as a post-colonial 
democracy enjoys substantial global appeal. One may even argue that India is a unique case of a 
nation whose political identity, thanks to its hybrid nature, has near-universal appeal. Is its 
political identity a factor in India’s communication of its soft power? If yes, how is this done? 
These queries require exploration, and lead us to the main research question of this thesis.  
 
1.2     Research Question 
 
Power was defined by Robert Dahl in 1957 as “the ability to get others to do what they otherwise 
would not do”. Echoing this classical definition, power is generally understood as the ability to 
influence or affect others in order to obtain the outcomes one wants (Nye, 2008; 2017). 
Historically and traditionally, it has been viewed in essentially tangible terms, such as military or 
economic (Wagner, 2005). This was especially the case for neorealist theorists like Kenneth 
Waltz, who underscored the significance of economic and military capabilities while ranking 
states according to their power capabilities (Waltz, 1979, p.131). 
In his canonical work ‘Soft Power’ (1990) American political scientist Joseph S. Nye Jr. was the 
first to separate these “hard” dimensions of power from what he called a “soft power” approach, 
a term he coined to emphasize the salience of principles, values, and culture in a new era where 
the understanding of power was no longer solely dependent on military force. More recently, in 
his article ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’ (2008, p.96), Nye clarified the concept when he 
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defined a country’s soft power as resting on three primary resources: “its culture (in places where 
it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and 
its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)”, and dressed 
“soft power” itself in soft power terms when he called it the “power of seduction”. Simply put, 
instead of coercing or pressurizing others to do what you want, soft power focuses on getting 
them to “want what you want” (Hocking, 2005, p.33). 
 
The persuading power of ideas and cultural attraction arguably gained traction in the period after 
the end of World War II. Competing values and ideologies, as Jan Melissen (2005) points out, 
were the root of the military and economic rivalries which arose during the Cold War. 
Competition in the soft power sphere spilled over into the realm of hard power. Peter van Ham 
(2005, p.48) takes this further by arguing that it was the ideological erosion of communism 
which ultimately resulted in the loss of Soviet legitimacy and control over its ‘satellite states’, 
military strength notwithstanding. This is corroborated by Nye’s (1990, p.169) observation of 
Soviet teenagers’ proclivity for blue jeans and American recordings. While the understanding of 
soft power is, clearly, not new, it has certainly emerged as “increasingly important in the global 
information age” (Melissen, 2005, p.4). Janice Mattern (2005) argues that its feasibility has 
increased because the advancements in information technology have made its communication 
easy and cheap. Within academics, the rise of constructivist theories of international relations 
and the criticism of neorealist notions have enhanced interest in the topic (Baldwin, 2016). 
 
In contemporary times, with the use of military power becoming restricted and costly in an 
increasingly inter-linked and economically inter-dependent world where several states possess 
sophisticated weapons capabilities, soft power is growing in significance as the power to 
influence other actors through “attraction or persuasion” rather than “coercion or payment” (Nye, 
1990, p.167-168). Supranational entities such as the European Union (EU) and to a lesser degree 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also harness the collective assets of their 
member-states as soft power (Ferguson, 2009). The traditionalist realist school views states as 
the only important actors within the international system, but Nye (1990, p.158) argues that 
though they lack military power, private actors such as large transnational corporations possess 
immense economic resources and increasingly engage in “co-optive” or soft power. Increasing 
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soft power activities by non-state actors, in particular, have benefited from technological 
advancements. But due to vested interests or external political pressures, these activities may at 
times contradict the interests of states, making it essential for states to manage the 
communication of their soft power resources. Moreover, effective use of soft power by states 
aids in safeguarding national military and economic interests as well, because it is able to create 
and sustain transnational bonds that are founded in shared ideals or objectives.  
Contrarily, the actual effectiveness of soft power has been subject to much skepticism, with 
several debates over how (if at all) to measure the real-world success of soft power strategies. 
Echoing its criticisms, Niall Ferguson, in 2009, rather condescendingly said of soft power, “it’s, 
well, soft”. Linked to Ferguson’s comment are academic debates on, whether for soft power to 
be truly compelling and credible, it necessarily needs to be backed up by the presence of hard 
power, i.e. whether “soft power requires the necessary resources and commitment to put words 
into actions” (van Ham, 2005, p.52). To counter criticisms, Nye asserted in 2008 that any 
drawbacks or complications in how governments control and employ soft power do not reduce 
its significance. It is certainly important to be cognizant of the skepticisms and criticisms that 
any discussion on soft power entails. But, this thesis will not focus specifically on the strength, 
legitimacy or success of soft power activities, or the different actors (state and non-state) who 
carry them out. Rather, it is concerned with what constitutes soft power and how a particular 
state (namely, India) wields it within its external relations. 
 
Nye’s writings form the basis of the conceptualization of soft power within this thesis. Building 
on his introduction of the concept in 1990 and his specific definition of the term “soft power” in 
2008 (p.96), and acknowledging the discussion and debates over soft power, as detailed above, 
this research utilizes the term ‘soft power strategies’ to refer to diplomatic or foreign policy 
strategies which rely on the appeal of a nation’s policies, political values, and culture.  
 
India’s capacity to influence other states and to resist unwanted influence arises from its power 
capabilities, both hard and soft (Perkovich, 2010). Since the late 1990s, scholars have been 
assessing India’s emergence as a major global actor due to economic and demographic 
calculations. The nation’s military capacity also swelled, and data from the Global Firepower 
Index 2018 shows that it now possesses the fourth most powerful military in the world. Its 
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military strength is admittedly largely due to the sheer numbers of its manpower resources 
(Rehman, 2012). However, in focusing on its hard power, many accounts overlooked India’s 
rising emphasis on “developing its ‘soft power’ credentials” by harnessing the attractiveness of 
its culture, values and policies (Blarel, 2012, p.28). Former Indian diplomat and United Nations 
(UN) Under-Secretary General Shashi Tharoor proclaims that “India truly enjoys soft power”, 
pointing to its economic, cultural, and political appeal (Tharoor, 2012, p.312). In his writing, 
Tharoor further advocates that in a world with many conflicts, the pluralistic nature of Indian 
society, and its espousal of the universal values of peace and non-violence have long been 
viewed as soft power assets which provide India with “the better story” (2007). 
 
The practical mobilization and expression of soft power resources was aided by the rising focus 
on public diplomacy, conceptualized by Melissen (2005, p.3) as being official communication, 
governmental or otherwise, which is aimed at foreign publics and non-official groups within 
foreign societies. This “engagement with foreign audiences” (Melissen, 2005, p.13) thus acts as a 
fundamental instrument for wielding soft power which strives to forge and strengthen 
international relationships. As argued by Brian Hocking (2005, p.35), public diplomacy is found 
particularly advantageous by countries which don’t possess “hegemonic proportions” of soft 
power and so benefit from strategic communication that “sells” their appeal.  
Demonstrating its focus on public diplomacy, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) 
established a Public Diplomacy Division in 2006. Further, the Indian Council for Cultural 
Relations aims to showcase India’s pluralistic and multicultural society through engaging with 
foreign populations via the establishment of centers in several countries. This can be seen as part 
of the recent international trend towards public diplomacy, which Melissen (2005, p.6) sees as 
symptomatic of soft power’s rise within international relations. In particular, under Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi from 2014 onwards, the Indian government has noticeably stepped up 
these efforts (Pant, 2015). Khanna and Moorthy (2017) point to the emphasis on digital 
diplomacy to convey India’s cultural, economic, military, and political prowess.  
 
Power must be seen as “a means, not an end” (Perkovich, 2003, p.133), and India’s status as a 
major developing country with more than 1 billion people implies that it uses power with the aim 
of securing its economic and developmental interests. These combine with its geopolitical 
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territorial and security interests, and motivate its engagements with public diplomacy and soft 
power. As Tellis (2016) insinuates, India’s great power ambitions hinge on its capacity to 
produce sustained long-term economic growth. Hence, soft power actions are connected to the 
pursuit of hard power goals. These actions are also driven by India’s desire for greater influence 
within international organisations, multilateral forums and decision-making processes at the 
global level, underpinned by its ambitions of great power status. Less than a year after assuming 
control, Prime Minister Modi challenged his diplomats “to help India position itself in a leading 
role, rather than just a balancing force, globally.” This path will be paved “either by the resolute 
use of military capabilities or by the persuasion of its soft power” (Tellis, 2016, p.6). 
 
Nye (2008, p.95) states that soft power is not simply influence through persuasion, but also “the 
ability to entice and attract”, and from this he infers that if soft power is “attractive power”, then 
“soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction”. He cautioned that merely 
“broadcasting” through public diplomacy is not functional if the inherent nature of what is 
broadcasted is not attractive. In other words, the effective wielding of soft power relies on the 
appeal of its sources. For India, its cultural appeal and the economic allure of being the second-
largest market in the world are the key soft power attractions.  
But, as Nye argued in 1990 (p.167), apart from cultural and economic appeal, the allure of 
ideology and institutions is vital. He reinforced this view later in 2008 (p.96) by including 
“political values” as a core constituent of a country’s soft power. He further stated that “cultural 
soft power can be undercut by policies that are seen as illegitimate”, providing the example of 
the decline in American soft power after the Iraq invasion. So, the exercise of soft power is not 
only about the communication of a country’s cultural traditions and economic prospects, but also 
majorly about the communication of its political values and thinking and about how legitimate 
and credible these values are (van Ham, 2005, p.48). This leads us to ask what exactly comprises 
India’s political identity and whether this identity influences its foreign policy and soft power 
strategies. But first, we must define the term ‘political identity’. 
 
In her paper (2012, p.370), Karen Smith adopts Constructivist notions to define state identity as 
variable and dependent on “socio-political, cultural, and historical values”. Following her 
description, this research defines the term ‘political identity’ as a nation’s perceived identity 
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based on its political values, institutions, and history. Building on this, India’s political identity is 
observed to be that of ‘a democratic post-colonial state’, which forms the focus of this research. 
This identity is derived from the Preamble to its Constitution, which proclaims India as a 
“sovereign … democratic Republic” (1949), after it achieved complete independence from 
British colonial rule in 1947, and its stance supporting state sovereignty and global 
decolonization after Independence, as is detailed below. 
 
While its democratic credentials have long been cherished by the nation, the Cold War’s end saw 
India being projected on the international stage as the world’s largest democracy and the most 
successful among post-colonial states (Choedon, 2015). The international consensus around 
democracy, liberalism, and human rights under an American-dominated world order led India’s 
democratic and secular achievements to be acknowledged (Blarel, 2012). From this, it can be 
understood that India’s democratic values form a potent part of its political identity. In fact, as 
observed by C. Raja Mohan (2014), former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared 
that democracy is central to India’s identity in the 21st century.  
Karen Smith (2012, p.373) argues that India’s struggle against British colonial oppression 
“continued to have a strong influence” on its worldview even after Independence. One of the first 
colonies to achieve independence in the post-World War II period, India was at the forefront of 
the call for global decolonization. As highlighted in Alden and Vieira (2005), being a leader of 
the anti-colonial struggles for independence across the developing world implies that post-
colonial ideals of sovereignty and solidarity are embedded within Indian political identity. This is 
particularly true as the nation strives to take its place in today’s global discourse as a leader of 
the developing and post-colonial world and as an advocate for South-South cooperation. 
 
The combination of democratic and post-colonial traditions with the historical Gandhian ideals 
of non-violence and India’s successful experience with political pluralism and religious diversity, 
leads scholars such as Wagner (2010, p.333) to state that India assuredly “qualifies” as a soft 
power. The appeal of its polity was realized early in the post-Independence era by Indian policy-
makers, who used ideological power to compensate for a lack of military and economic 
resources (Smith, 2012; Tellis, 2016). An example is India’s leading role in the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) during the Cold War. Contrarily however, Nayar and Paul (2003, p.26) argue 
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that this ideational foreign policy fell short during the defeat to China in the 1962 war, leading 
the Indian policy-makers to recognize the significance of material capabilities (hard power) to 
back up soft power. This observation is reiterated by Sumit Ganguly (2010), and ties in with 
Nye’s emphasis on the importance of combining hard and soft power strategies in a way that 
they “reinforce each other”, as he articulated recently in 2017 (p.2). Following its economic 
reforms of July 1991, India experienced immense economic growth in the late 1990s which 
continued through the 2000s. As of 1998, India, despite being a non-signatory to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), tested its first nuclear weapons and its nuclear arsenal has 
grown impressively since then (Yang, 2016). These upward trends in its economic and military 
power, with its lasting commitment to universal peace and non-violence, bolstered its ideological 
soft power. In particular, economic factors such as the high degree of economic liberalization 
and greater trade opportunities “increased India’s international attractiveness” (Wagner, 2010, 
p.334), especially in the 21st century.  
 
Soft power is not a “normative” concept, and relies on acceptance by the intended audience 
(Nye, 2017). For instance, even an extremist terrorist organisation can exercise soft power 
amongst those who follow or accept its ideology. So, a soft power asset is only truly so when 
seen as attractive by its target audience. Since Indian diplomacy is geared towards foreign 
governments and publics, the strategies for exercising soft power towards an individual foreign 
state are shaped by the nature of India’s appeal in the eyes of that state. This leads us to the 
question: Do foreign states find India’s political identity appealing? 
Here, it is pertinent to keep in mind that while India’s own political identity is that of a 
democratic post-colonial state, it must engage externally within an international system 
comprising both democracies and non-democracies as well as both historical colonizers and the 
historically colonized. Moreover, these categories are not always easily distinguishable from 
each other. Rather, the lines are often blurred. Most of the Western former imperial powers have 
prided themselves on their democratic government structures especially after the end of World 
War II, but some such as Spain and Portugal have undergone vast periods of authoritarian and 
military rule in the 20th century. Further, out of these nations which were historical colonizers, 
some accepted a new relationship with their former colonies after Independence, while others 
contested decolonization militarily before eventually accepting the colonies’ independence and 
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sovereignty (Duara, 2004). Today in the 21st century, as the same nations rejoice in their 
democratic and liberal societies, their history as colonial occupiers remains an uncomfortable 
subject for most (Loomba, 2015).  
The situation is even more complex in the case of countries which had undergone colonial rule, 
i.e. post-colonial countries, some of which are democratic while others are not. Samuel 
Huntington (1991) pointed out that after undergoing decolonization, many of the newly-
independent post-colonial countries in Asia, Africa, and South America succumbed to 
dictatorships or military domination, while others endured civil wars; India, “the premier 
democracy of the Third World” (1991, p.23) is a rare example of a post-colonial state that has 
enjoyed a long-lasting robust democracy. While certain post-colonial nations have achieved 
varying degrees of democratic success, this is by no means widespread. The Democracy Index of 
2017 by the Economist shows that several post-colonial states have made recent gains with 
regard to the development of democracy and rule of law. Nevertheless, the same index shows 
that many (if not most) post-colonial nations are still not democratic, with the prevalence of 
autocratic regimes and practices.  
 
Keeping in mind such complex identities of the individual states that India must engage with, as 
well as the dichotomies between the historical colonizers and the historically colonized, it may 
be argued that a particular country would find certain Indian political values more appealing than 
others. Does this lead India to emphasize different parts of its democratic post-colonial political 
identity in relations with different states? Which identity does it emphasize for which country? 
How is this done? Also interesting is the role played by India’s own colonial past as a British 
colony. While India may be reluctant to emphasize its post-colonial identity with non-
Commonwealth colonial powers, is it possible that this reluctance does not extend to the United 
Kingdom (UK), where it might be a way of establishing historical bonds? 
 
Going by these questions, it is logical to expect that historical and political sensitivities assume 
importance in India’s soft power considerations, especially those concerning the use of its 
political identity as a soft power. Thus, this thesis addresses the question of ‘How does India use 
its political identity within its soft power strategies for other states in the 21st century?’  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RELEVANCE 
 
 
2.1    Literature Review 
 
Power is a central theme of the literature on international relations, with Elster (1976, p.249) 
calling it “the most important single idea in political theory”. As David Baldwin noted recently 
in 2016 in his ‘Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach’, the scholarly 
foundations for the study of power were laid by Howard Lasswell and Kaplan in ‘Power and 
Society’ (1950), and taken forward by Robert Dahl in ‘The Concept of Power’ (1957) and Steven 
Lukes in ‘Power: A Radical View’ (1974), among others. Dahl’s simple and commonly accepted 
definition has been stated in the Introduction to this thesis. Baldwin also discusses the 
conceptualization of power in some of the major approaches to the study of international 
relations: realism focuses on the balance of power, neo-realism and offensive realism; 
constructivism focuses on the combination of material notions of power with social construction 
of reality; finally, neoliberalism highlights power as part of the dynamic and complex 
interdependence in the international system. In 2004, Mistry (p.66) observed that within the 
wider literature, power is viewed as having myriad dimensions which include “economic and 
military capabilities, national will, internal strength, relative standing versus other states, soft 
power, fungibility, and an ability to influence others and to control international outcomes”. 
In 1990, Joseph S. Nye Jr. observed that “power is becoming less transferable, less coercive, and 
less tangible” (p.167). His introduction and definition of “soft power” as a crucial component of 
power, with regard to the significance of a country’s culture, political values, and foreign 
policies, laid the foundation for academic and political discourses on soft power. Nye’s writings 
(1990; 2004; 2008; 2017) stimulated the subsequent debates on soft power and the benefits that 
the use of this attractive power can accrue for public diplomacy and foreign policies. Since the 
previous section has already detailed the academic discussion on soft power’s conceptualization, 
exercise, and limitations, it will not be duplicated here. Instead, this section provides a review of 
the literature on the soft power of India, and also examines what answers the existing literature 
can produce to address the research question of this thesis. 
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Within the academic work on India’s foreign policy, much attention has been devoted to India’s 
rise as a global player or its status as an emerging power in the recent times, by both Indian and 
non-Indian authors alike. Some of the premier authors on this theme, such as Sumit Ganguly 
(2002; 2010), David Malone (2011; 2015), C. Raja Mohan (2004; 2009; 2015), and Harsh Pant 
(2008; 2009; 2016), have documented and researched this phenomenon through books, journal 
articles, and newspaper editorials. Justifying this research, Sumit Ganguly’s ‘India as an 
Emerging Power’ (2002, p.1) noted that “(India) has a substantial military apparatus, a growing 
economy with some world-class sectors, and democratic political institutions that have withstood 
countless vicissitudes. Consequently, India’s place in the global order at the Cold War’s end 
merits careful scrutiny.” India’s soft power, i.e. the global appeal of Indian culture and values as 
forming a strong soft power asset, has been a growing theme within these works. Though it has 
been late in arriving to the Indian scene, largely in the mid-to-late 2000s, debates over soft power 
have rapidly gained sharper focus. In the literature, this focus was illustrated in 2003 by C. Raja 
Mohan when he stated that the South Asian nation possesses “strong cards in the arena of soft 
power”. Amongst the not-so-academic works, Shashi Tharoor, former Indian diplomat and UN 
Under-Secretary General and current Member of Parliament of India, has written on India’s 
global role and its soft power (2012; 2015; 2016). In fact, Tharoor is largely credited with 
popularizing the term and concept of ‘soft power’ within the mainstream discussion on Indian 
foreign policy. Albeit more political, his writings offer an illuminating view of the policymakers’ 
side of the discussion, but must nevertheless be regarded with healthy skepticism as they run the 
risk of spilling over into political propaganda. He does, however, make some astute observations, 
evidenced in his book ‘Pax Indica’ (2012, pp. 279-287), where he argues that a country’s soft 
power emerges from “the world’s perception of what the country is all about”, with cultural 
heritage, diversity, Bollywood, plural values and principles, and prowess in information 
technology forming the world’s perception of India. As an Indian diplomat (who preferred to 
keep his name confidential) remarked in an interview (25 April 2018), “the world sees India as a 
relatively non-violent, tolerant and pluralistic democracy with a benign international influence.” 
 
Several scholars have analyzed the strengths and successes as well as the weaknesses and 
failures of India’s soft power strategies (Hymans, 2009; Heng, 2016), and also discuss the 
untapped potential (Wagner, 2005; 2010; Ramachandran, 2015). A largely untapped source of 
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soft power has been India’s development and humanitarian assistance activities. Ganguly and 
Mullen, in an online article in 2012 observed that “due to India’s status as an emerging economy, 
a consolidated democracy, and a developing country free from colonial influence, Indian foreign 
assistance has great legitimacy in the eyes of other emerging countries”, arguing that this 
legitimacy is “in clear contrast to that of China”. Joseph Nye himself, in an article in 2006, stated 
that India’s “democratic constitution and political structure” meant that “it has passed a test that 
China still faces, and that makes India a source of attraction”. But, China has been observed as 
being much ahead of India when it comes to soft power in a practical sense. In fact, many 
scholars have chosen to compare India’s approach with that of China’s, emphasizing the 
difference in (particularly political) soft power resources and the greater success that China 
seems to have enjoyed with its strategies. Echoing the limitations of the Indian approach, 
Christian Wagner, in ‘India’s Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations’ (2010) found India to be a 
“defensive soft power” (p.341) because of its apparent reluctance to transform capacities into 
capabilities or tangible instruments of influence. In line with this argument, an Indian diplomat 
remarked in an interview that “soft power was an element of India’s soft power that we always 
knew we had, but never focused on in a very detailed manner” (30 April 2018). To address this, 
Rani Mullen noted that the nation “must design and resource coherent strategies” (2015, p.188) 
for communicating its soft power effectively, which has been largely under-utilized. 
 
Researchers and analysts, for instance Bibek Debroy in ‘India's Soft Power and Cultural 
Influence’ (2009), have at times decided to focus on individual components of Indian soft power. 
Culture being a core soft power resource for India, it is no surprise that several authors examine 
its role in building an international image for India. Amit Gupta’s  ‘Commentary on India’s Soft 
Power and Diaspora’ (2008) points to spiritualism and ancient civilizational culture captivating 
Western imaginations as being “exotic” and forming a point of connection for the Indian 
diaspora. In an interview for this thesis, an Indian diplomat referred to the cultural aspects, 
saying that “the Indian diaspora abroad and Bollywood have enormous soft power potential” (30 
April 2018). Bollywood, India’s mainstream film industry has also been the focus of literature by 
Anjali Roy (2012) and Daya K. Thussu (2013), which specifically emphasizes its potency as a 
soft power. Prime Minister Modi’s emphasis on the so-called “Yoga diplomacy” is detailed by C. 
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Raja Mohan (2014), where he points to India’s successful lobbying for June 21 to be declared as 
the ‘International Day of Yoga’ by the UN General Assembly.  
 
On the other hand, fewer works detail the political aspect of Indian soft power. Here, the soft 
power of democracy emerges as a central theme. Scholars like Wagner (‘From Hard Power to 
Soft Power?’, 2005) observe that India has historically shied away from promoting democracy as 
an ideal among other developing states; it instead adopts a “cautious prudence” of providing 
democracy assistance only when requested (Choedon, 2015, p.164). These academic 
observations are corroborated by an Indian diplomat who said that India offers assistance with 
constitutional development and training programmes to other nations, but “this is not overt” (30 
April 2018). Nicolas Blarel, in an interview conducted for this thesis (4 May 2018), calls this a 
“bottom-up” approach of democracy assistance, quoting the example of Afghanistan which 
sought India’s assistance with its parliamentary structure. So, rather than democracy promotion, 
Karen Smith argues in her article ‘India's Identity and its Global Aspirations’ (2012) that 
stressing non-alignment and decolonization defined Indian policies towards these states. This is 
corroborated by S.D. Muni in ‘India's Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension’ (2009, p.8) 
who argues that despite joining the Community of Democracies in 2000 and the UN Democracy 
Fund in 2005, democracy promotion is not central to Indian foreign policy as it “might have 
breached the solidarity of the anti-colonial and anti-racial movement led by India under the 
umbrella of non-alignment”. But several accounts have observed that this changes with regard to 
the approach towards Western democracies. For instance, in ‘Soft Power in Indian Foreign 
Policy’ (2011), David Malone, former Canadian Ambassador to India and current Rector of the 
United Nations University, states that democracy has become “a key element of India’s 
international identity”, arguing that the failure of Emergency in 1975-77 and the immediate 
return to democracy highlighted the “enduring nature of India’s democracy”; this leads India to 
advertise “its own credentials when relating to other democratic countries” (p.36).  According to 
Nicolas Blarel’s article ‘India’s Soft Power’ (2012), India’s democratic stability is lauded 
because it is perceived as “complementing rather than challenging” the existing international 
order (p.32). Blarel raised this point when he was interviewed as well, where he said that India’s 
actions have to be seen as “accommodative and not conflicting with the interests of other 
powers” (4 May 2018). This observation was corroborated by an Indian diplomat (25 April 
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2018), who offered the example of Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbot’s visit to India in 2014 
to finalize the sale on uranium to the non-NPT country, where Abbot justified the sale by saying 
that “India threatens no one … and is a friend to many”. George Perkovich, in ‘Is India a Major 
Power’ (2003), noted that some impediments notwithstanding, India’s democratic performance is 
astounding because “no state in history has been as populous, diverse, stratified, poor, and at the 
same time democratic as India” (p.134).  
Political pluralism and acceptance of social diversity are also hailed by several scholars as being 
crucial for India’s identity and soft power, especially when perceived as “an antidote to the 
extremism rampant around the world” (Pant, 2015). Blarel (2012, p.30) argues that India’s 
“democratic, federal, and secular political model” showcases the real-world possibility of the 
political accommodation of diversity. As Shashi Tharoor (2012, pp.285-286) points out, in May 
2004, the world’s largest exercise of democratic franchise resulted in “a Roman Catholic leader 
making way for a Sikh to be sworn in as Prime Minister by a Muslim in a country 81 per cent 
Hindu” something that “caught the world’s imagination and won its admiration”. This somewhat 
political but nevertheless factually convincing argument showcases the soft power of Indian 
polity. Ashley Tellis, in ‘India as a Leading Power’ (2016) sees India’s “capacity to assimilate 
diverse foreign ideas, cultures, and peoples over the milennia” as its “native strength” (p.15).  
Respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states are 
political principles resulting from India’s colonial past, included by much academic literature as 
an important soft power asset. Amrita Narlikar, in 2008 in ‘What Rationality, Whose Design and 
Governance How’, highlights the post-colonial aspect of India’s interactions with other 
developing states within multilateral platforms. Blarel (2012, p.32) also observes this angle, 
stating that India promotes its “image of the country which inspired the anti-colonial struggles of 
the last century”. These arguments with a political focus are important to consider, in light of this 
research’s focus on India’s political identity as a democratic post-colonial state.  
 
Overall, from the review of the existing literature on India’s soft power, it becomes apparent that 
there is little research which focuses exclusively on Indian political identity as a soft power asset. 
As detailed above, David Malone, C. Raja Mohan, Nicolas Blarel, Harsh Pant, Christian Wagner 
and Shashi Tharoor explore the soft power facets of political identity and history, but only do so 
within a broader and more wide-ranging discussion on India’s soft power and public diplomacy.  
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 2.2    Academic and Societal Relevance 
 
It is clear from the section on the literature review that there are several academic works and 
researches that focus on the immense cultural facets of India’s soft power. However, as can also 
be observed from this review, the non-cultural and specifically political aspects of Indian soft 
power only find mention within the broader discussions and debates on Indian foreign policy and 
diplomacy. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no focused study on the salience 
of India’s political values and identity, as a soft power resource for the South Asian nation. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of in-depth analysis of whether India’s soft power strategies employ 
different parts of its political identity in relations with different target states. This research 
project strives to fill this gap in the existing research.  
This is done by conducting an empirical study to analyze and compare the manner in which 
India’s political identity as a democratic post-colonial state is utilized within India’s soft power 
strategies for other states in the 21st century, i.e. beginning from 1 January 2000. This research 
holds significant academic relevance since it aims to expand the scope of the present literature 
and make a new contribution to the study of Indian soft power, along with contributing to the 
wider academic debate on soft power sources and how they are utilized by governments. 
 
Addressing this research question also retains societal relevance. As a major developing country 
with a vast population, India strives to achieve sustained economic growth, which aids in greater 
social development. Bilateral and multilateral international trade, investment, and tourism 
contribute towards this, and cultivating relationships through the strategic use of soft power, such 
as the power of political identity and ideology, takes on significance. Through its study of India’s 
political identity as its soft power, this research highlights how perceptions of Indian political 
values and institutions can influence India’s standing in the eyes of foreign publics and 
governments, and thus in turn, India’s approach towards these foreign states.  
Achieving influence and credibility abroad, both within and beyond its immediate 
neighbourhood, is crucial in India’s quest for great power status and as a viable balance for its 
powerful geographical neighbour China. In the contemporary world, relations between different 
sets of states (democracies and non-democracies, developed and developing countries, former 
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colonial powers and ex-colonies) are being constantly reshaped by the forces of globalization. 
Joseph Nye said, “Information is power”, pointing to the importance of “diplomacy aimed at 
public opinion” (2008, p.99). India’s aspirations for greater say in global decision-making 
processes while navigating the constraints of an interdependent and networked world system 
mean that it must employ its soft power to engage constructively with different states with 
varying societies and structures of government. Given the rare and hybrid nature of India’s 
political identity, its political history and values can play a central role within such soft power 
exercises. If and how Indian political values are perceived positively among different types of 
states, thus, becomes salient. Further, rising reputations in the international sphere can also 
generate national pride and domestic goodwill towards the ruling administration, thus proving 
useful for political leaderships in a democratic country like India. While effective use of soft 
power serves as public diplomacy abroad for the Indian administration, it can also be public 
diplomacy within the domestic sphere. So, political soft power is significant for both foreign and 
domestic policy-making. 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.1    Theories 
 
To address the research question, constructivism and post-colonialism provide a relevant 
theoretical framework. Academic works pertaining to these theories are examined in this section. 
The premises of these works are then deduced and applied, in conjunction with practical 
observations, in order to formulate hypotheses, which are later tested through an empirical study. 
 
Constructivist notions offer a useful starting point for exploring the central theme of state 
identity within international relations. Ted Hopf, in his article ‘The Promise of Constructivism in 
International Relations Theory’ (1998), provides an overview of how constructivism, both 
“conventional” and “critical” (p.171), comprehends some of the most significant issues in 
mainstream international relations theory. Conventional constructivism, he says, views identities 
as necessary in international politics in that they perform three key functions: “they tell you and 
others who you are and they tell you who others are” (p.175). In this way, constructivism differs 
from neorealism (where the state has an eternal identity stemming from self-interest) by claiming 
that the identities of states are variable. Building on this, Hopf argues that these identities should 
be seen as empirical, which depend on “historical, cultural, political, and social” contexts 
(p.176), and that interests (and later, actions) are a product of such identities. The implication, 
clearly, is that a state’s identity influences its interests and foreign policy preferences and its 
consequent actions. The choices of states are, similarly, constrained by their understanding of the 
identities and interests of other states; so, how state A behaves towards state B is moderated by 
state A’s understanding of state B’s identity. In particular, the argument about how a state’s 
historical past and political context influences its identity and external actions is relevant for this 
thesis, seeing as how India’s political identity as a post-colonial democracy is in focus. This also 
ties in with similar post-colonialist arguments. Hopf also addresses the constructivist approach to 
power, which incorporates “discursive power”, i.e. the “power of knowledge, ideas, culture, 
ideology, and language” (p.177), as an important aspect of power, thus separating it from 
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neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism’s sole focus on material (military and economic) 
power. His highlighting of the impact that prevailing social practices and norms have on state 
action echoes Nye’s argument that values and ideas must be perceived as legitimate in order to 
be effective as soft power.  
In the second half of his article, Hopf discusses critical constructivism, and particularly how it 
differs from conventional constructivism on the theme of state identity. He argues that while 
critical constructivists also see state identity and interests as variable, they are “more likely to see 
some form of alienation driving the need for identity”, meaning that the production of one’s own 
identity requires difference with another (p.184). This is rooted in their assumptions about 
power, which they see as present in all social exchanges and where one actor is always dominant. 
These notions of identities and actions driven by social “instances of hierarchy, subordination, or 
domination” (p.185) are reflected in the arguments made by post-colonial scholars, detailed 
further in this section. Similar to the critical constructivists that Hopf considers, other scholars 
have also criticized arguments which limit themselves to merely recognizing that states have 
distinct identities and interests. Rebecca Adler-Nissen, in her article ‘The Social Self in 
International Relations: Identity, Power and the Symbolic Interactionist Roots of Constructivism’ 
(2016, p. 27-39), argues in favour of a constructivism which emphasizes “symbolic 
interactionism” as an influencing power, i.e. the notion that complex two-way social interactions 
between states give rise to “forms of dominance or structural inequalities” and influence state’s 
normative behaviours and self-perceptions. This can be seen as linked to the alienation and 
domination theme in the critical constructivism detailed by Hopf. 
Overall, from Ted Hopf’s article and his discussion of the critical constructivist arguments, it can 
be inferred that India’s historical and political contexts affect its state identity, which in turn 
influences its exercise of power as well as its foreign policy actions. 
 
The post-colonial school of international relations theory is valuable in its demonstration of how 
identities related to colonial experiences continue to influence state behaviour even in the post-
colonial period. Critical constructivist notions were used by Himadeep Muppidi in his book 
‘Politics of the Global’ (2004) where he prescribed a “critical constructivist framework” to 
examine the processes of globalization (p.18). This framework was adopted by him in his later 
work ‘The Colonial Signs of International Relations’ (2012), arguing for an anti-colonial 
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theoretical framework for the study of international relations (p.8). He exposes the failure of 
mainstream theories in addressing the continuing assumptions and influence of colonialism 
within their understanding. He draws attention to the ways in which exclusion, oppression, and 
even death in the colonialist style occurs in theoretical perspectives, by focusing on particular 
disastrous events and violent incidents in contemporary times; Muppidi highlights Western 
humanitarian interventions and democracy-related projects as a neocolonial hegemony which is 
imposed on the neocolonial ‘other’ (2012, p.126). These Western actions are often coloured by a 
sense of disdain, as he writes “the colonized…are never really ready for, or with the times” 
(2012, p.53). This leads to interesting questions on how democratic countries from within the 
colonized world (such as India) perceive their own institutions of human rights and rule of law, 
and how this impacts their relations with others with similar histories of being oppressed, thus 
tying in with the theme of this research project. Muppidi’s call for a new framework for 
theorizing international relations paved the way for other scholars to offer more concrete post-
colonial understandings of contemporary global politics.  
In her book ‘Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China’ 
(2013), Manjari Chatterjee Miller explains how colonial legacies lead post-colonial states to have 
what she calls a “post-imperial ideology” (p.7). She draws on psychological literature to assert 
that colonialism forms a collective historical trauma for the ex-colonies, i.e. they desire to be 
“recognized and empathized with in the international system as a victim” (p.8). Her focus is on 
states that underwent “extractive colonialism”, where the “purpose was to shift the resources of 
the colony to the colonizer, often with few to no protections for the native populace against 
abuse by the colonial authority” (p.9). According to her, the post-imperial ideology is predicated 
on how decolonized countries espouse a sense of entitlement and a desire for a new and more 
equitable international order, all motivated by their personal and collective colonial suffering. 
Miller criticizes the traditional theories about state behaviour, such as realism, neorealism, and 
liberal theories, for privileging Western states. Even when these theories do consider non-
western states, economic and material disparities form the basis of distinction from the more 
developed countries. This leads her to state that the study of international relations remains 
incomplete without accounting for colonialism and its legacies. Miller uses her conceptualization 
of a post-imperial ideology for analyzing the international behaviour of India and China as they 
“seek to alter the international status quo” (p.3), states which otherwise differ vastly in their 
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governmental and power structures and even in the nature of their colonial experiences. She 
argues that these states highlight their post-colonial identity and their belief in historical 
victimhood, in order to emphasize the importance of territorial sovereignty and status, which also 
influences their foreign policy decisions. In her book, Miller states that the post-imperial 
ideology and colonial past is an “essential component of India’s national identity” (p.7) and self-
perception, one that matters even in the contemporary era. Her argument strengthens this 
research’s inclusion of India’s post-colonial identity as a significant constituent of its political 
identity, which has an impact on its foreign policy-making. 
Discussing the viewpoint of the former colonizers, Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz, in their paper 
‘After Empire’ (2002), focus on the “special relationships” which often evolved between former 
colonizers and their ex-colonies, with Spain, the United Kingdom (UK), and France using the 
rhetoric of “family” to describe contemporary ties with ex-colonies (2002, p.267). They argue 
that such “historically conditioned notions of collective relations” and identity motivates 
European powers to maintain valued relationships with ex-colonies (2002, p.268). Keeping their 
observations in mind will be interesting for noting whether the rhetoric might come from the ex-
colony’s side as well, i.e. if a ‘special relationship’ perception is also reflected within India’s 
behaviour towards the UK. 
 
While this thesis focuses on critical constructivist and post-colonial perspectives, some scholars 
have examined Indian foreign policy through other theoretical lenses. One example is the work 
of Mischa Hansel  and Miriam Möller, who, in their article ‘Indian Foreign Policy and 
International Humanitarian Norms: A Role‐Theoretical Analysis’ (2015), go past realist premises 
of geopolitics and constructivist arguments of culture and identity to focus on the influence that 
international expectations of its global role may have on Indian foreign policy. While not 
denying ideational factors like identity and historical experiences, they use ‘role theory’ to argue 
that “national role conceptions” (p. 82) primarily drive the considerations of India’s foreign 
policy. Highlighting how along with being the “largest democracy on earth and proud of its 
liberal and secular values”, it remains “one of the staunchest defenders of the concepts of 
sovereignty and non-intervention”, they examine India’s approach to Responsibility to Protect 
and International Criminal Law within its foreign policy-making (p.79). Role theory is not in 
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focus within this thesis. Nevertheless, it is important to remain cognizant of these other 
approaches to better inform one’s own study, and also to open up avenues for further study. 
 
Thus, as inferred from the arguments made in the theoretical works examined above, the research 
undertaken for this thesis will be set against the theoretically assumed backdrop of a 21st century 
world where the historical experiences of colonialism continue to impact the identities, interests, 
and behaviour of nations with colonial pasts, including both former colonizers and the colonized. 
 
 
3.2    Hypothesis and Variables 
 
This thesis draws on theoretical premises which claim the influence of historical experiences on 
state identity and behaviour even in the 21st century, and links these to the study of India’s 
political identity and how it wields this identity as a soft power asset in dealings with other 
states. In doing so, this thesis introduces the deductive hypothesis given below. 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS: The colonial history of a certain state shapes India’s use of its political identity 
as a democratic post-colonial state within its soft power strategy towards that state. 
 
In this hypothesis, the independent variable is ‘colonial history of a certain state’, which this 
thesis defines as an individual state’s own historical experience with colonialism, whether as a 
nation that was a historical colonizer or one that was historically colonized. To define 
‘colonialism’, Ania Loomba’s (2015, p.23) concept of “administrative colonialism” is utilized in 
this research. In her book ‘Colonialism/Postcolonialism (The New Critical Idiom)’ she uses this 
term to discuss the situation where a colonizing country controls the colony mainly through “a 
military, administrative, and economic apparatus” and to a large extent without a “large 
movement of people from the colonizing country to the colony”. She provides the examples of 
India, Namibia, and South Africa to clarify this definition, thus differentiating them from the 
“settler colonialism” experienced by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  
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The dependent variable is ‘India’s use of its political identity as a democratic post-colonial state 
within its soft power strategy’. As has been detailed in the Introduction to this thesis, this is 
defined as India’s self-perceived democratic and post-colonial identity which arises from its 
political values, institutions and history, and how this is exercised strategically as soft power. 
 
 
Following the stating of the primary hypothesis, two sub-hypotheses are introduced, which serve 
to operationalize the variables: the independent variable is operationalized as (i) erstwhile 
colonial power nation, and (ii) former colony nation, while the dependent variable is 
operationalized as (i) political identity as a democratic state, and (ii) political identity as a post-
colonial state. Moreover, the sub-hypotheses further elaborate on the primary hypothesis, based 
on the assumption that for an effective soft power strategy, India has to focus on a dimension of 
its political identity that best resonates with the target country. 
 
 
Sub-hypothesis 1: If a state is an erstwhile colonial power nation, then India is likely to 
prioritize its political identity as a democratic state in its soft power strategy for that state. 
 
Following from Loomba’s (2015) definition, the term ‘erstwhile colonial power nations’ here is 
used for nations which had historically extended their authority/rule over foreign territories or 
established political or economic dominance through acquiring and controlling colonies. The 
dependent variable is operationalized as the usage of official governmental channels to 
communicate or emphasize India’s ‘political identity as a democratic state’, which follows from 
its Constitution (1949) and its proven credentials as the world’s largest democracy.  
 
This sub-hypothesis is based on the assumption that stressing India’s political identity as a post-
colonial state in relations with erstwhile colonial power nations may lead to discomfort and 
wariness stemming from historical injustices being carried forward to the present day. This may 
hinder diplomatic efforts seeking to create strong partnerships based on common worldviews. It 
is, instead, India’s cherished democratic ideals that appeal to these nations which themselves 
take pride in their democratic societies (Malone, 2011; Blarel, 2012; Choedon, 2015). “We are 
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the largest democracy”, reiterated an Indian diplomat (with a hint of pride) who was interviewed 
for this thesis (30 April 2018). She elaborated by pointing out how unusual it was for a newly-
independent nation to “carve out a Constitution” that enshrined all the basic values of a 
democracy. C. Raja Mohan (2014) observes that starting from Prime Minister Vajpayee in 1998 
and continuing under Prime Ministers Singh and Modi, India began selectively injecting 
democracy in its global engagements. This is further corroborated by Harsh Pant (2015) who 
states that the Modi administration focuses on democracy and emphasizes shared political values 
“to strengthen ties with the West and democracies in Asia”. So, this sub-hypothesis argues that in 
relations with erstwhile colonial power nations, India prioritizes the communication of its 
democratic political identity over the post-colonial identity. 
 
                                                                        
Sub-hypothesis 2: If a state is a former colony nation, then India is likely to prioritize its 
political identity as a post-colonial state in its soft power strategy for that state. 
 
Here, again based on Loomba’s (2015) definition, the term ‘former colony nation’ refers to 
nations which had historically been fully or partially politically controlled or occupied by a 
colonial power of the time, and are now fully independent and sovereign states. The dependent 
variable is operationalized here as utilizing official governmental channels in order to 
communicate or highlight India’s ‘political identity as a post-colonial state’, on account of India, 
being a former British colony that is now fully and formally independent (Loomba, 2015). 
 
This sub-hypothesis follows from the assumption that since most post-colonial nations have not 
had similarly successful experiences with democracy, India’s emphasis on its democratic 
political identity might be seen as Western-style political preaching or ‘democracy promotion’ 
by other former colony nations, something generally having negative connotations in the eyes of 
these countries (Muni, 2009). Such practices could prove to be counter-productive in Indian 
efforts for establishing shared values and stronger bilateral ties. Nicolas Blarel, in an interview (4 
May 2018), observed that many Western democracies have attempted to “co-opt” India into their 
global push for democracy, but India has resisted. Thus, as argued earlier, India’s history as a 
supporter of decolonization processes, its leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement and forums 
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of the Global South, and its principles of post-colonial solidarity and respect for territorial 
sovereignty, appeal to these nations (Smith, 2012). This can be seen in India’s strategy in the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) where it “acts as a leader of coalitions involving developing 
countries” (Narlikar, 2008, p.271). Further, as pointed out by Blarel (2012, p.32), unable to 
compete with China’s massive financial investments in Africa, India relies on its perception as a 
crusader for global decolonization and an anti-apartheid advocate for strengthening relations 
with African states. So, the second sub-hypothesis argues that when it comes to relations with 
former colony nations, India prioritizes its post-colonial political identity over its identity as a 
democratic state. 
 
In order to answer the research question of this thesis, a comprehensive testing of the main 
hypothesis and the two sub-hypotheses has been undertaken by conducting empirical research, as 
is detailed in the following chapter. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1     Research Design 
 
The objective of this thesis is to determine how political identity factors in India’s exercise of 
soft power towards other states. To this end, an empirical study has been conducted, in order to 
confirm or reject the main and sub-hypotheses introduced by this thesis. In doing so, this 
research aims to contribute to the study of India’s soft power and build on the existing academic 
literature and the observations of scholars and Indian foreign policy analysts on the topic.  
 
This thesis comprises empirical explanatory research on the basis of a Small-N qualitative 
comparative case study, using a most-similar systems design. Roger Pierce (2008, p.51) states 
that comparative case study is most widely used in international relations, and involves obtaining 
data from a sample of states at the same points in time, which would allow the hypotheses to be 
tested. The comparative nature of the study means that limitations of external generalizability 
will be easier to avoid than that in the case of a single case study. The Small-N comparative 
method also enables the provision of contextual descriptions of the observed similarities and 
differences between the cases (Pierce, 2011, p.56). Though a small number of samples is subject 
to the danger that selection bias becomes difficult to avoid (Landman, 2003), this risk was found 
to be inescapable due to the limited availability of time and resources for the study to be 
conducted. Moreover, the detailed and in-depth data required for a qualitative study meant that 
only a limited number of cases could be studied. A most-similar systems design is logical 
because the cases only differ in one factor, as is explained further in this section. Because the 
outcome (dependent variable) is also different, then that one factor could possibly be seen as the 
probable cause for the outcome. 
 
Four nations were selected as the cases in total. In a comparative case study, at least one case is 
required per variable. This research qualifies because there are two cases per sub-hypothesis, i.e. 
per variable. In each case, there was a study of India’s soft power strategies towards the specific 
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country selected, focusing particularly on India’s use of its political identity as a democratic 
post-colonial state. 
 
The four nations selected as case studies within this research project are: (in alphabetical order) 
Indonesia, South Africa, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK).  
 
Since this thesis concerns itself with the study of how India’s identity as a democratic and post-
colonial state serves as a soft power tool, it was considered crucial for the individual nations 
selected for the case study to have certain relevant characteristics. The selection was non-
random, and with the main hypothesis and the operationalization of the variables in mind, three 
criteria were judged as important for guiding the selection process:  
 
a) The nation has historical experience with colonialism: 
In order to test the main hypothesis of this thesis, only nations with a colonial history, either as a 
colonizer or as a colonized territory, could be studied. Further, since sub-hypothesis 1 is 
concerned with erstwhile colonial power nations while sub-hypothesis 2 concerns itself with 
former colony nations, it was essential that out of the four cases, there would be two per each 
category of nations. So, the selection of the UK and the Netherlands can be justified since both 
are erstwhile colonial powers, with each controlling their respective colonial empires during the 
16th–20th centuries. Furthermore, out of the two, the UK had been India’s own colonial ruler, 
whereas the Netherlands held other colonies. This allowed an observation of any possible 
differences in the Indian approach to erstwhile colonial power nations based on its own colonial 
past as a British colony. Similarly, Indonesia and South Africa were selected because they are 
both former colonies of different erstwhile colonial powers; South Africa was a British colony 
for most of its colonization, while Indonesia was a Dutch colony. Moreover, South Africa had 
the same colonial ruler as India, with Indonesia being colonized by a different one. This enabled 
the observation of whether there are differences in India’s strategies based on similar colonial 
experiences at the hand of the same colonial power. Thus, based on their (albeit oppositional) 
historical experiences with colonialism, it can be argued that all four nations retain the ability to 
take cognizance of the post-colonial debates within international discourses, that was important 
for the testing of the main hypothesis. Keeping this in mind, studying whether India chooses to 
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prioritize its political identity as a democratic state in its relations with the Netherlands and the 
UK holds significance for testing sub-hypothesis 1.  
 
b) The nation is a democracy: 
This project aims to study if political identity plays a role in India’s soft power strategies for 
other states. While familiarity with post-colonial themes within political identity was discussed 
in the first criterion, a nation’s ability to at least recognize and preferably identify with 
democratic themes is also crucial for answering the research question. All of the selected nations 
have had democratic governments throughout the 21st century, with the minor exception of 
Indonesia where indirect elections through the People’s Consultative Assembly gave way to 
direct Presidential elections only in 2004. However, Indonesia still qualifies as a suitable case for 
this study, because the progress towards democracy began with the commencing of the reforms 
era in Indonesian politics in 1999. So, democratic ambitions and reformist sentiments prevailed 
among Indonesian people and its political structures. With respect to the contemporary era, the 
Democracy Index of The Economist (2017) qualifies the Netherlands and the UK as “full 
democracies”. Although the Index rates them as “flawed democracies”, Indonesia and South 
Africa are still classified as being democracies and can also be observed as being amongst the 
most democratic post-colonial states rated by the Index. Moreover, India itself was rated as a 
“flawed democracy” (2017), and this demonstrates that Indonesia and South Africa can be 
expected to identify with India’s own democracy. Hence, it is possible for India to stress its 
political identity as a democratic state in bilateral relations with all four nations. Whether India 
nevertheless prioritizes its political identity as a post-colonial state over its democratic identity in 
relations with democratic former colony nations such as Indonesia and South Africa was, thus, 
crucial for testing the main hypothesis and sub-hypothesis 2.  
 
c) The nation holds significance for India: 
A country attempts to exercise soft power in order to influence another country’s behaviour or 
position, or to generate goodwill. In order for India to attempt to influence another country 
through soft power, it must deem that country’s behaviour, position, or goodwill as significant 
for Indian interests. As a major developing economy, economic interests are treated as crucial 
within Indian foreign policy-making. Perkovich (2003, p.132) argued that “greater participation 
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in international trade, particularly increased exporting, can boost national income significantly as 
well as enhance a state's power by making others depend on it”. So, high trade and economic ties 
with India were considered essential in the selection of countries for the case studies. The 2016-
17 Annual Report of India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry aids in gauging the significance 
of countries for India, based on bilateral trade. According to this data, each of the four selected 
nations are counted among the top ten trading partners for India in their respective continents – 
the Netherlands and the UK among India’s top ten trading partners in Europe, Indonesia is within 
the top ten trading partners in Asia, and South Africa within the African continent. Moreover, the 
online ‘Indian Trade Portal’ (2015) of the Ministry lists all four of the selected nations within the 
worldwide top twenty-five export destinations for India. Thus, based on their economic 
importance for India, it can be argued that India has reasons to turn to soft power in its bilateral 
dealings with these countries, in order to manifest stronger relations and better trade ties. 
 
From the explanations of the three criteria given above, it can be deduced that Indonesia, South 
Africa, the Netherlands, and the UK are all democracies and also hold considerable economic 
significance for India. Furthermore, each country has had historical experience with 
“administrative colonialism” as defined earlier (Loomba, 2015, p.23). The only differing factor is 
that whereas the Netherlands and the UK are categorized as erstwhile colonial power nations, 
Indonesia and South Africa are former colony nations. These selection criteria are presented in 
Table 4.1 as a simple checklist, where ✔ means ‘yes’ and ✘ means ‘no’. 
 
Table 4.1: Case study selection criteria: Checklist 
 
COUNTRY 
 
(in alphabetical 
order) 
 
COLONIAL HISTORY 
 
DEMOCRACY  
 
(Democracy 
Index 2017) 
 
ECONOMIC 
SIGNIFICANCE 
FOR INDIA Erstwhile colonial power 
nation 
Former colony 
nation 
 
Indonesia 
 
✘ 
 
✔ 
 
✔ 
 
✔ 
 
South Africa 
 
✘ 
 
✔ 
 
✔ 
 
✔ 
 
The Netherlands 
 
✔ 
 
✘ 
 
✔ 
 
✔ 
 
The UK 
 
✔ 
 
✘ 
 
✔ 
 
✔ 
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The inclusion of two cases per sub-hypothesis, and hence a comparative case study method, does 
reduce the risk of limited external generalizability which a single case per sub-hypothesis would 
bring. At the same time, however, this danger cannot be entirely eliminated because all the 
nations of the world which qualify for the study could, of course, not be studied, due to the 
immense limitations of time and resources. Furthermore, in addition to the three criteria detailed 
above, the specific selection of the Netherlands was also motivated by practical reasons, owing 
to the researcher’s own location in The Hague. Thus, working within certain constraints, the 
selected countries were deemed suitable to undergo a Small-N comparative case study based on a 
most-similar systems design, in order to test the main and sub-hypotheses. 
 
Since India’s soft power strategies for other states in the 21st century are to be examined, each 
case was studied from the beginning of the 21st century till just before the commencement of data 
collection for this project. Thus, the time period of 1 January 2000 till 31 March 2018 was 
studied. This period was decided upon acknowledgement of practical issues such as data 
collection under constraints of time and financial resources, as has been addressed before. 
Complementarily, though, the selection of this time duration also has academic merit. Tellis 
(2016) has argued that freed from the shackles of Cold War alliance-management calculations in 
the 1990s, India thereafter pursued “specific forms of collaboration” in its bilateral relations with 
different countries. India’s economic growth from the late 1990s also raised its foreign appeal in 
the 21st century (Blarel, 2012; Malone et al, 2015), arguably leading to greater scope for the 
exercise of soft power. 
 
 
4.2     Data Sources and Collection  
 
Qualitative data comprising both primary and secondary sources have been utilized within this 
thesis. Data from secondary sources have been used mainly for reviewing, understanding, and 
quoting academic arguments and observations by scholars and analysts, identifying a theoretical 
framework, and also for the purpose of deductive reasoning in order to frame hypotheses, as can 
be seen in each of the previous sections. This has been in the form of relevant existing academic 
and theoretical literature, as well as news articles, opinion articles or editorials from reputed 
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online sources, and has been collected through the physical and online libraries of Leiden 
University, and reputed national and international media sources. 
 
Under the original research conducted in this thesis, in order to address its research question and 
test its hypotheses, data from primary sources have been utilized. Only official Government 
communication during and regarding bilateral visits between India and the specific country 
selected as the case (Indonesia, South Africa, the Netherlands, or the UK) have been considered. 
Further, only bilateral visits (to and from India) at the level of the following state and 
government leaders are included in the study: 
1. President or King/Queen of the state 
2. Vice or Deputy President of the state 
3. Prime Minister of the state 
4. Foreign Minister or Minister of External Affairs of the state 
The information or data required for this thesis was collected for the time period of 1 January 
2000 to 31 March 2018, i.e. the 21st century. 
 
The data has been obtained from the official online archives which are available at the website of 
the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) of the Government of India. The websites of India’s 
diplomatic missions in the UK, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Indonesia were also purveyed 
in order to extract any supplementary information about the official visits. Since no additional 
published data could be found on the websites of the Indian missions, only those obtained from 
the MEA website were studied. Eighty-one documents were studied in total, which consisted of 
the following official published communication from the Government of India:  
1. Press releases, media briefings, and interviews 
2. Speeches and statements 
Details on the bilateral visits included and the number of documents used for each case can be 
found below in Table 4.2a. A complete list of the documents is given in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4.2a: Primary Data: Official published communication from the Government of India 
 
No. 
 
CASE  
 
(in alphabetic 
order) 
 
BILATERAL VISITS 
 
(total number of visits to and from India  
during 1 January 2000 – 31 March 2018) 
 
 
DOCUMENTS 
STUDIED 
 
(total number) 
 
1 
 
Indonesia 
 
10 visits (5 visits to India, 5 visits from India) 
 
 
16 documents 
 
2 
 
South Africa 
 
14 visits (4 visits to India, 10 visits from India) 
 
 
24 documents 
 
3 
 
The Netherlands 
 
8 visits (5 visits to India, 3 visits from India) 
 
 
12 documents 
 
4 
 
The UK 
 
19 visits (9 visits to India, 10 visits from India) 
 
 
29 documents 
 
Table 4.2a shows that for erstwhile colonial power nations (the Netherlands and the UK), which 
concerns sub-hypothesis 1, a total number of forty-one documents have been collected for 
analysis. Similarly, for former colony nations (Indonesia and South Africa), i.e. those that 
concern sub-hypothesis 2, forty documents have been collected for analysis in total. So, the 
distribution of documents amongst both categories is well-balanced. Press conferences, 
statements, and interviews conducted by Indian leaders jointly with their foreign counterparts 
have not been included, because the focus of the study is solely on India’s soft power strategies 
for other states. Joint or combined communication implies that the positions or strategies of the 
foreign state are also incorporated and conveyed within it. Similarly, documents released or 
published together, such as joint communiqués, bilateral declarations, and joint action plans, are 
also not included. Visits to and from the selected countries which included focus on mutual 
multilateral platforms have been included in the study, since they often contain targeted 
communication for the specific host or visiting country. For instance, an Indian Prime Minister 
on a visit to South Africa to attend a BRICS summit also often makes press statements or 
speeches to address India-South Africa bilateral relations. So, case-specific information from 
these visits has been included, while multilateral statements, declarations, and communiqués 
have been left out. Furthermore, due to time constraints, only the speeches, statements, and 
interviews by Indian leaders at the hierarchical levels specified earlier were analyzed, thus 
excluding any statements or briefings by diplomats or officials of the Indian Foreign Service. As 
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can be observed, the bilateral visits and documents available for case of the Netherlands were 
significantly less than those available for the other cases. This has been compensated for within 
the elite interviews, with most interviewees based in the Netherlands, as will be shown below. 
 
New primary information was also obtained through the conduction of elite interviews. The 
interviews were carried out in a semi-structured manner, meaning that they were guided but still 
rather open-ended, enabling the securing of in-depth and non-restrictive but still relevant answers 
from the interviewees. The semi-structured interview format is “essentially one of question-and-
discussion” (Pierce, 2008), much like a purposeful conversation. Each interview comprised five 
topic-related and open-ended questions, along with four pre-determined supplementary (follow-
up) questions. Questions on India’s general approach were used, without delving into the specific 
approach to the four selected nations. Due to the discussion-style format, impromptu follow-up 
questions were used at times, to obtain more depth in the answers. Open-ended questions were 
considered suitable for seeking lengthy and descriptive answers since they are concerned with 
“why and how, beliefs, opinions, forecasts and narratives” (Pierce, 2008). Gentle prompts, 
clarifications, and brief summarizations were also utilized during the interview process. This 
research’s own hypotheses were mentioned towards the end of the interview, so as to “give the 
elite the opportunity to dissuade” the researcher from the hypothesis (Pierce, 2008).  
 
The term ‘elite’ does not necessarily mean that those interviewed have a “high social, economic, 
or political standing”, but that they were chosen “because of who they are or what position they 
occupy” instead of a random or anonymous selection (Hochschild, 2009). The elite interviews 
consisted of individual semi-structured interviews with Indian diplomats as well as an academic 
scholar. The diplomats were selected as interviewees due to their important role in policy-
making and the implementation of Indian foreign policy and soft power. The scholar was 
selected due to his academic expertise on the topic. Four interviews, with three diplomats and 
one scholar, were conducted in total, as can be observed in Table 4.2b.  
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Table 4.2b: Primary Data: Elite Interviews (semi-structured) 
 
No. 
 
PROFESSION 
 
NAME 
 
LOCATION 
 
METHOD OF 
INTERVIEW 
 
1 
 
Diplomat, 
Government of India 
 
Confidential 
 
The Hague, the Netherlands 
 
In person 
 
 
2 
 
Diplomat, 
Government of India 
 
Confidential 
 
The Hague, the Netherlands 
 
In person 
 
 
3 
 
Diplomat, 
Government of India 
 
Confidential 
 
Beijing, China 
 
Skype 
 
4 
 
Assistant Professor, 
Leiden University 
 
Dr. Nicolas Blarel 
 
Leiden, the Netherlands 
 
In person 
 
 
 
In order to arrange the elite interviews, these individuals were approached via email or through 
personal contact. While the interviewees were not given any advanced notice of the questions, 
they were made aware of the theme of the research, i.e. India’s soft power, prior to the actual 
interview. Before commencing the interview, the attribution of source was confirmed, meaning if 
the elite interviewee wanted his/her name to remain confidential. The interviews were carried out 
either in person or via Skype, and were conducted approximately 7-10 days after the initial 
request for an interview was made. Each elite interview lasted approximately 30 minutes.  
Two out of the three diplomats interviewed are posted at the Indian mission in The Hague, a 
decision driven by convenience. In these two specific interviews, Indo-Dutch relations were also 
discussed spontaneously (in addition to the general-style questions in the interview protocol), to 
strengthen the case study on India’s soft power strategies for the Netherlands, owing to the lesser 
number of official visits and documents available for this case. Unfortunately, more persons 
(diplomats and/or scholars) could not be interviewed, due to time-related limitations and 
problems of accessibility, which is to be expected especially in the case of diplomats.  
Along with collecting new data, these elite interviews were also helpful in corroborating the data 
collected from the other primary and secondary sources. 
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4.3     Methods of Data Analysis 
 
‘Research Methods in Politics’ (2008) by Roger Pierce provided helpful guidance in designing 
and implementing the analytical process for this thesis, and is referenced throughout this section. 
The objective of academic research is to answer the research question through either confirming 
or infirming the hypothesis (Pierce, 2008, p.177). This requires a systematic and thorough 
examination of the information collected, which has been carried out within this thesis using the 
two methods of qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis. The data described in the 
previous section, i.e. official communication documents from the Government of India and the 
content of the elite interviews, have been examined, and the results interpreted in the next 
chapter, with inferences being drawn. The inferences and observations are then discussed 
comprehensively, which later lead to the conclusions.  
 
Qualitative content analysis, also referred to as textual analysis, is concerned with specific words 
and phrases that occur in the content. In the context of this research, the ‘content’ refers to the 
text of the official published documents collected. A substantive form of content analysis 
involves counting the frequency and distribution of certain key words and phrases in the textual 
data (Pierce, 2008, p.269). Such an examination of the data enables the determination of the 
extent to which specific words and phrases linked with India’s political identity are used by the 
Government of India in their official communication during important bilateral visits with the 
four nations selected for the case study. The process of content analysis is made simpler and 
faster by the use of technological scanning of the text. This research utilizes the navigation and 
scanning tools of Microsoft Word to carry out the qualitative content analysis of the data. The 
‘advanced find’ settings of the program allow us to find all word forms of the key word being 
searched, such as ‘end’, ‘ended’, ‘ending’, etc. Further, it ignores punctuation characters like ‘-’ 
and ‘:’, and white-space characters, which helps in controlling for the varying styles of writing a 
phrase. The text, which is already in the form of a Microsoft Word document, is analyzed by 
searching for the key word and obtaining its frequency within the document. So, the process is 
relatively straightforward and no coding of any kind is required. 
In order to use Microsoft Word effectively, all the textual documents available for each case 
were first merged and compiled as one complete Word document for the respective case. For 
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instance: the 16 documents available for Indonesia’s case were transformed into one document, 
the 24 documents available for South Africa were transformed into one document, and so on, 
leading to four complete documents or text files in total (one per case). A quick scan of each 
complete text file, coupled with logical and educated expectations, enabled the creation of a list 
of key words and phrases. These key words and phrases were selected because they are linked to 
India’s political identity as a democratic post-colonial state. The selection was done by 
employing logical reasoning and expectations, based on the literature reviewed and the 
researcher’s own academic background as a graduate of Political Science from one of India’s 
central universities, the University of Delhi. This list, with fifty words and phrases that are 
separated by the aspect of political identity they are linked to, is presented in Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3: List of Key Words and Phrases (50 in total) 
 
IDENTITY 
 
KEY WORDS and PHRASES 
 
 
 
 
Democratic 
Identity 
 
 
 
 
Democratic 
 
Rule of Law 
 
Liberal 
 
Democracy 
 
Representation 
 
Election 
 
Civil society 
 
Democratization 
 
Liberties 
 
Plural 
 
Constitution 
 
Vote 
 
Equality 
 
Participation 
 
Values 
 
Ideals 
 
Electorate 
 
Parliament 
 
Rights 
 
Republic 
 
Secular 
 
Suffrage 
 
Multiparty 
 
Consensus 
 
Justice 
 
 Total : 25 key words/phrases 
 
 
 
 
Post-colonial 
Identity 
 
 
 
Post-colonial 
 
Colonial 
 
Non-violence 
 
Freedom 
 
Independence 
 
British Raj 
 
Free 
 
History 
 
Decolonization 
 
Empire 
 
Gandhi 
 
Struggle 
 
Solidarity 
 
Movement 
 
Imperial 
 
Legacy 
 
Sovereignty 
 
Non-interference 
 
Historical 
 
Commonwealth 
 
Oppressed 
 
Ruled 
 
Territory 
 
Liberation 
 
Injustice 
 
 Total : 25 key words/phrases 
 
 
The words/phrases were entered one by one into each complete document, using navigation and 
scanning tools. Searching in this manner was carried out in order to obtain the frequencies of the 
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key words within the data. Since the search also demonstrates the sentence context that the key 
word/phrase is found in, it could be discerned whether the word/phrase was in that instance 
indeed connected with either India’s democratic or post-colonial political identity, rather than 
being used in a different context. This enabled the determination and comparison of which 
aspects of India’s political identity are used by it for which foreign states. The findings are 
presented in the next chapter on Results and Analysis. 
 
Since qualitative content analysis is concerned primarily with the frequency of certain terms 
within the data, it has only been utilized to analyze data from the official published documents. It 
was decided to abstain from using this method to analyze the data obtained from the elite 
interviews, because the interviewees were guided and prompted by the questions and the 
researcher into mentioning and addressing the specific terms during the interview. So, analyzing 
the mere frequency of those terms for this data would skew the results unfairly in favour of the 
hypotheses, which has been sought to be avoided by not using the qualitative content analysis 
method for the elite interview data. This demonstrates, in practical terms, a major criticism of 
this method, i.e. it might not be more than simplistic word-counting. On a positive note, 
however, it enables an initial ‘reading’ of the textual data, which provides a basic understanding 
of the significance (if any) accorded to India’s political identity within its soft power strategies 
for each selected country. This method is also relatively low-cost and less time-consuming, due 
to the use of the navigation tools of Microsoft Word, as has been detailed above. But, it is 
important to keep in mind that diplomatic text, such as the ones being analyzed, are carefully and 
deliberately planned, containing judicious and discreet language. The key words or phrases may 
not entirely reflect the main concerns, or might even “conceal or divert attention from real policy 
concerns” (Pierce, 2008, p.267). Overall, its limitations mean that qualitative content (or text) 
analysis, while being useful, is insufficient as the sole method of analysis. So, after carrying out 
this preliminary analysis, further strengthening by more in-depth methods is required. Discourse 
analysis is one such in-depth method. 
 
Essentially, discourse is understood as being a “mode of communication” where the “language is 
political”, i.e. a system of meaning where the language has “ideational, referential, and 
propositional” purposes (Pierce, 2008, p.281). Norman Fairclough, in ‘Language and Power’ 
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(2000), lays out his method of critical discourse analysis, focusing on the relationship between 
text, interactions, and contexts. Fairclough (2000, p.92-93) developed a three-stage system of 
critical discourse analysis:  
1. Description: identification of the formal properties, i.e. vocabulary, grammar, and textual 
structures, of the text. 
2. Interpretation: identification of the relationship between the text and nature of interaction. 
3. Explanation: identification of the relationship between the interaction and the social 
context, i.e. how the discourse is affected by and how it influences social structures. 
Fairclough’s method of critical discourse analysis has been used for this study. This is done for 
the data collected from the official published documents, while the information from the elite 
interviews is used for the purposes of corroboration and substantiation.  Such a structured 
framework for analysis enabled a detailed and critical assessment of textual data, thus allowing 
one to read between the lines. Keeping in mind the main and sub-hypotheses to be tested, 
specific parts of the text which discussed or alluded to India’s political identity and soft power 
were analyzed in this manner. This allows an investigation of any subtle and non-obvious 
references to India’s political identity as a democratic state or as a post-colonial state within the 
text, as has been done here. 
 
However, as Pierce (2008) pointed out, Fairclough’s method “emphasizes the interpretations 
given by the audience rather than the intention of the text-producer”, making it “highly 
speculative” (p.299). Pierce argues that this weakness can be remedied by the inclusion of other 
methods, such as using content analysis to calculate the actual frequency of key words and the 
inclusion of interviews with those involved in the text-producing. As has been explained earlier, 
both of these suggested remedies have been incorporated within this study.  
The combination of the qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis leads to a 
comprehensive examination of the data. While content analysis is helpful for conducting an 
initial analysis, discourse analysis is important for its detailed study. Thus, the data analysis 
undertaken to address the research question of this thesis can be viewed as appropriate, 
especially considering the limited time available to the researcher. The results of the data 
analysis are presented, interpreted, and discussed in the next chapter. 
  
42 
 
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
5.1     Findings and Interpretation 
 
In order to examine the data collected, qualitative content analysis was initially carried out on the 
official published communication from the Government of India, during bilateral visits with 
leaders of the four countries selected as cases. In this way, the frequency of key words and 
phrases, i.e. the number of times a certain word or phrase appears within the text, was obtained, 
as is recommended by Roger Pierce (2008). Due to the somewhat elementary nature of this 
analysis, the method of discourse analysis, in the form of Norman Fairclough’s (2000) three-
stage system with its focus on description, interpretation, and explanation, was utilized to 
conduct a deeper study. The results have then been interpreted. Moreover, the data obtained from 
the elite interviews that were conducted by the researcher has been utilized to corroborate, verify, 
and substantiate the analysis. The data was examined and interpreted first through qualitative 
content analysis and later through discourse analysis, and is presented below in the same order. 
 
 
 
a) India’s soft power strategies for INDONESIA 
 
The published governmental information regarding bilateral visits between India and Indonesia 
in the 21st century was first analyzed using the method of qualitative content analysis, the results 
of which can be seen in Table 5.1a. 
 
Table 5.1a: Frequency of Key Words and Phrases in the Data (16 documents) for India-Indonesia relations 
 
No. 
 
INDIA’S DEMOCRATIC IDENTITY 
 
INDIA’S POST-COLONIAL IDENTITY 
 
Word/Phrase 
 
Frequency 
 
Word/Phrase 
 
Frequency 
 
1 
 
   Democratic 
 
8 
 
   Post-colonial 
 
0 
 
2 
 
   Rule of Law 
 
1 
 
   Colonial 
 
6 
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3 
 
   Liberal 
 
0 
 
   Non-violence 
 
2 
 
4 
 
   Democracy 
 
15 
 
   Freedom 
 
12 
 
5 
  
   Representation 
 
0 
 
   Independence 
 
7 
 
6 
 
   Election 
 
4 
 
   British Raj 
 
0 
 
7 
 
   Civil Society 
 
0 
 
   Free 
 
3 
 
8 
 
   Democratization 
 
0 
 
   History 
 
6 
 
9 
 
   Liberties 
 
0 
 
   Decolonization 
 
0 
 
10 
 
   Plural 
 
9 
 
   Empire 
 
0 
 
11 
 
   Constitution 
 
0 
 
   Gandhi 
 
8 
 
12 
 
   Vote 
 
0 
 
   Struggle 
 
5 
 
13 
 
   Equality 
 
0 
 
   Solidarity 
 
2 
 
14 
 
   Participation 
 
0 
 
   Movement 
 
4 
 
15 
 
   Values 
 
5 
 
   Imperial 
 
0 
 
16 
 
   Ideals 
 
0 
 
   Legacy 
 
3 
 
17 
 
   Electorate 
 
1 
 
   Sovereignty 
 
1 
 
18 
 
   Parliament 
 
0 
 
   Non-interference 
 
0 
 
19 
 
   Rights 
 
0 
 
   Historical 
 
20 
 
20 
 
   Republic 
 
9 
 
   Commonwealth 
 
0 
 
21 
 
   Secular 
 
1 
 
   Oppressed 
 
2 
 
22 
 
   Suffrage 
 
0 
 
   Ruled 
 
1 
 
23 
 
   Multi-party 
 
0 
 
   Territory 
 
2 
 
24 
 
   Consensus 
 
0 
 
   Liberation 
 
1 
 
25 
 
   Justice 
 
1 
 
   Injustice 
 
0 
  
               TOTAL 
 
54 
 
   TOTAL 
 
85 
 
 
Table 5.1a shows that out of the sixteen published documents containing official communication 
from the Government of India, references to India’s political identity as a post-colonial state 
(eighty-five in total) are significantly higher than references to its identity as a democratic state 
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(fifty-four in total). On closer observation, it also becomes clear that the invocation of its 
democratic identity involved the usage of only ten out of the twenty-five possible words/phrases. 
Furthermore, the words “democratic”, “democracy”, “plural”, and “republic” are specifically 
stressed, while terms that arguably make up the essence of democracy, such as “rule of law”, 
“civil society”, “equality”, and “rights” are not in focus within this communication aimed at the 
Indonesian government and people. From this, it can be inferred that references to India’s 
democratic identity are largely peripheral, in the sense that commonality may be established 
based on how both countries are pluralistic democratic republics without delving into the 
intricacies of what this may entail. 
On the other hand, the usage of terms linked to Indian post-colonialism is more widely dispersed 
and expansive, with seventeen possible words/phrases appearing in the text. Even amongst the 
usual suspects like “freedom”, “independence”, and “Gandhi”, it is interesting to note that the 
term “historical” stands out as it is mentioned twenty times within the text. This repeated appeal 
to pre-contemporary circumstances could demonstrate a desire to forge or strengthen bonds 
founded in similar or shared experiences or incidents in history, with colonial experiences 
forming the bulk while ancient cultural linkages are also referenced. 
 
On completion of the qualitative content analysis, discourse analysis of the data based on 
Fairclough’s three-stage system, as explained in section 4.3, was undertaken. The documents 
collected for the case of Indonesia included eight speeches or addresses, one interview, and five 
statements to the press or media by Indian leaders, and two press releases from the Government 
of India.  
The press releases are characterized mainly by formal language, where information about 
bilateral visits is provided in a systematic manner. While colonialism is not mentioned explicitly, 
India’s ‘historical linkages’ and commonalities with Indonesia are acknowledged early on, 
perhaps as a way of establishing a sense of two similar nations in the mind of the reader. Their 
status as large and pluralistic democracies is mentioned towards the end, and within the context 
of expectations of similar future global roles. The statements to the press/media are largely 
intended for an audience that comprises domestic and Indonesian publics. These are marked by 
simplistic language and an overview of the bilateral relations and multi-dimensional partnerships 
between the two nations. Both history and present democratic values are invoked at the onset, 
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and the democratic status is linked to that of being emerging economies, which leads the foray 
into the importance of economic cooperation. An interesting observation is that the emphasis on 
historical ties, in the context of colonialism as well as cultural links, is accorded separate status, 
while democracy is often clubbed together with economic concerns. In an interview, an Indian 
diplomat stated that when it comes to Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, “cultural 
connections” are increasingly being used, in tandem with post-colonial ideals (30 April 2018). 
This could be seen as public diplomacy, where the influencing power of familiarity is used for 
the purpose of advancing people-to-people ties. In October 2013 during an official visit to 
Indonesia, the Indian Prime Minister at the time, Dr. Manmohan Singh, was interviewed by the 
Indonesian newspaper ‘Kompas’, which has also been published by India’s Ministry of External 
Affairs. While the bulk of the interview is devoted to trade and security issues, it begins tellingly 
with the two Asian countries’ shared experiences during the struggle for freedom from colonial 
rule and post-colonial solidarity leading to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), with references 
to their democratic set-ups forming a minor part towards the end. Speeches by India’s External 
Affairs Ministers (EAM) tend to be reasonably balanced in their references to India’s democratic 
and post-colonial identities, and touch upon a wide range of bilateral concerns, predominantly 
economic. The speeches and addresses by Indian Presidents and Vice-Presidents provide perhaps 
the most substantial and descriptive content for analysis. The speeches made in formal 
diplomatic settings all begin by recollections of shared history, with specific description of how 
the agony of foreign rule and colonial subjugation united the two peoples in their fight for 
freedom and against the forces of global exploitation. The Bandung Conference of 1955 and the 
two nations’ leading roles in NAM are often hailed as connecting them, and the commitment to 
territorial sovereignty is highlighted. Democratic success in the 21st century certainly finds 
mention within these speeches, but the spirit of anti-colonial struggles is often invoked to lend 
support to the significance of participative democracy and pluralism. Further, emphasis is also 
placed on the need to reform structures of global governance such as the UN, arguably pointing 
to a desire for a more equitable and just international structure. The Vice-President’s speech at 
the Indonesian University of Udayana in November 2015 is distinctly informal and descriptive, 
perhaps owing to the audience of mainly students and scholars. Ancient civilizational and 
cultural linkages are referenced early on, then giving way to focus on democracy and pluralism. 
Mahatma Gandhi and his ideals of tolerance and non-violence are described as reflecting mutual 
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ties. In most of the documents, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is accorded 
significance, with two speeches by Indian leaders, made in Jakarta, focusing on India’s relations 
with ASEAN. In these speeches, there seems to be an underlying sense that positive relations 
with Indonesia, the largest ASEAN state, are hoped to pave the way for stronger ties with 
ASEAN as a whole. 
 
Overall, while democratic practices and the diverse and pluralistic composition of both the 
nations are regularly highlighted, the references to post-colonialism, particularly the respective 
freedom struggles and their shared NAM ideals after independence are more dominant within the 
discourse in the data analyzed. 
 
 
 
b) India’s soft power strategies for SOUTH AFRICA 
 
To examine India’s soft power strategies towards South Africa, twenty-four documents 
comprising official communication from the Indian government on bilateral visits with South 
Africa in the 21st century were available. These were analyzed using qualitative content analysis 
to derive the frequencies of key words or phrases, and the results are shown in Table 5.1b. 
 
Table 5.1b: Frequency of Key Words and Phrases in the Data (24 documents) for India-South Africa relations 
 
No. 
 
INDIA’S DEMOCRATIC IDENTITY 
 
INDIA’S POST-COLONIAL IDENTITY 
 
Word/Phrase 
 
Frequency 
 
Word/Phrase 
 
Frequency 
 
1 
 
   Democratic 
 
5 
 
   Post-colonial 
 
0 
 
2 
 
   Rule of Law 
 
0 
 
   Colonial 
 
5 
 
3 
 
   Liberal 
 
0 
 
   Non-violence 
 
5 
 
4 
 
   Democracy 
 
9 
 
   Freedom 
 
17 
 
5 
 
   Representation 
 
1 
 
   Independence 
 
10 
 
6 
 
   Election 
 
6 
 
   British Raj 
 
1 
 
7 
 
   Civil Society 
 
2 
 
   Free 
 
3 
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8 
 
   Democratization 
 
0 
 
   History 
 
12 
 
9 
 
   Liberties 
 
0 
 
   Decolonization 
 
0 
 
10 
 
   Plural 
 
2 
 
   Empire 
 
0 
 
11 
 
   Constitution 
 
2 
 
   Gandhi 
 
34 
 
12 
 
   Vote 
 
2 
 
   Struggle 
 
13 
 
13 
 
   Equality 
 
3 
 
   Solidarity 
 
2 
 
14 
 
   Participation 
 
1 
 
   Movement 
 
7 
 
15 
 
   Values 
 
5 
 
   Imperial 
 
0 
 
16 
 
   Ideals 
 
1 
 
   Legacy 
 
5 
 
17 
 
   Electorate 
 
0 
 
   Sovereignty 
 
0 
 
18 
 
   Parliament 
 
4 
 
   Non-interference 
 
0 
 
19 
 
   Rights 
 
1 
 
   Historical 
 
4 
 
20 
 
   Republic 
 
8 
 
   Commonwealth 
 
2 
 
21 
 
   Secular 
 
0 
 
   Oppressed 
 
4 
 
22 
 
   Suffrage 
 
0 
 
   Ruled 
 
2 
 
23 
 
   Multi-party 
 
0 
 
   Territory 
 
1 
 
24 
 
   Consensus 
 
0 
 
   Liberation 
 
2 
 
25 
 
   Justice 
 
1 
 
   Injustice 
 
3 
           
                TOTAL 
 
53 
 
   TOTAL 
 
132 
 
 
It can be observed from Table 5.1b that references to India’s post-colonial identity, with one 
hundred and thirty-two key words/phrases being utilized, far outnumber the references to its 
democratic identity, with only fifty-three words/phrases used. In the case of South Africa, it 
becomes immediately apparent that “Gandhi” is invoked substantially (thirty-four times) within 
post-colonial references. This is not surprising, considering that Mahatma Gandhi’s time as a 
lawyer and civil rights activist in South Africa before returning to India was widely influential on 
his political thinking and emergence as the leader of the Indian movement for independence 
(Guha, 2012), which has long been a unifying factor in both nations’ freedom struggles. The fact 
that this is seen by India as relevant even in the 21st century, along with terms such as “freedom”, 
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“independence”, “history”, “struggle”, and “movement”, points to the theme of post-colonialism 
running strong in India’s political soft power approach for South Africa. Additionally, the 
presence of the terms “British Raj” and “Commonwealth” reveals the intention to convey 
solidarity and similarity based on foreign rule by the same colonial power, something that was 
(expectedly) missing in the case of India’s approach towards Indonesia. 
Here, unlike what was seen for Indonesia, sixteen out of the possible twenty-five words/phrases 
connected to democracy are used at least once each. The words “democracy” and “republic” 
have the highest frequencies within these sixteen words/phrases, but others such as “civil 
society”, “Constitution”, “equality”, “values”, “Parliament”, and “rights” also find mention. 
Thus, the references to aspects of democracy, while paling in comparison to post-colonial 
aspects, certainly appear to be balanced and wide-ranging.  
 
Of the twenty-four documents analyzed for this case, there are thirteen speeches, five press 
statements, and six press releases issued by the Government of India. A detailed analysis was 
undertaken using the method of discourse analysis. 
The press releases are issued in formal and curt language, and provide an overview of all the 
details of a particular visit, either to or from India. The existence of a long-term political 
relationship is occasionally acknowledged, but no details or explanations about this relationship 
are offered in any of the press releases. When a visit coincided with a specific event related to 
independence from colonial rule or any commemoration related to Gandhi, this was mentioned 
explicitly in the press releases, due to the afore-stated connection between the two nations that 
Gandhi’s legacy and their similar colonial experiences forged. On the other hand, democracy is 
referred to scarcely here, and only to show that the path to democracy emerged after freedom 
from foreign rule was achieved.  
The speeches and press statements by Indian leaders are markedly descriptive and focus strongly 
on historic ties. Once again, anti-colonial struggles and Gandhi come up in multiple forms within 
almost every speech, with a marked sense of similarity being stressed. There seems to be an 
acknowledgement that Gandhi, and the political values he stood for, are as much South African 
as Indian. Later, the speeches and statements go on to describe the common future aspirations of 
both nations. Even in speeches made at business forums, where the economic issues of trade and 
investment are the main topics, the post-colonial ideal of solidarity and India’s support for South 
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Africa’s struggle against apartheid are touched upon. Mutual commitments to democracy are 
also mentioned in most speeches and press statements, but these are often made in relation to the 
nations’ economic interests and broader international concerns, particularly as important 
developing countries.  
A speech by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in July 2016 addressing the Indian diaspora in South 
Africa includes many references to similar historical experiences and Gandhi’s role in bringing 
the people of the two countries closer. Interestingly, democracy is not referenced in this speech 
directly. Most speeches also have specific mentions of British colonial rule, arguably to 
strengthen the sense of a shared past under the same colonial ruler with both countries going 
through similar hardships. This is in line with Nicolas Blarel’s expectation (4 May 2018) that the 
rhetoric of “we are both former British colonies” is visible in diplomatic speeches, invoking the 
sense of a “shared fate”. Furthermore, mutual objectives within common multilateral platforms 
were addressed in most documents, the main ones being the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South 
Africa) forum, and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping. Several 
documents in this case focused solely on BRICS, IBSA, and the African Union or pan-African 
issues and events, demonstrating the importance of South Africa as the gateway for India’s 
outreach to Africa. Common goals from the standpoint of global south cooperation are also 
elaborated within the communication.  
 
As the content analysis indicated earlier, India’s post-colonial identity is emphasized strongly 
within its soft power approach towards South Africa, much more than the communication of its 
democratic identity. The anti-colonial struggles of both nations, and particularly the important 
and binding legacy of Mahatma Gandhi, are invoked very frequently within the data.  
 
 
 
c) India’s soft power strategies for THE NETHERLANDS 
 
In the case of bilateral visits between India and the Netherlands, the analysis of twelve 
documents containing published governmental communication in the 21st century was 
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undertaken. The results of the initial examination using the method of qualitative content 
analysis are presented below in Table 5.1c.  
 
Table 5.1c: Frequency of Key Words and Phrases in the Data (12 documents) for India-Netherlands relations 
 
No. 
 
INDIA’S DEMOCRATIC IDENTITY 
 
INDIA’S POST-COLONIAL IDENTITY 
 
Word/Phrase 
 
Frequency 
 
Word/Phrase 
 
Frequency 
 
1 
 
   Democratic 
 
0 
 
   Post-colonial 
 
0 
 
2 
 
   Rule of Law 
 
2 
 
   Colonial 
 
1 
 
3 
 
   Liberal 
 
1 
 
   Non-violence 
 
0 
 
4 
 
   Democracy 
 
7 
 
   Freedom 
 
0 
 
5 
 
   Representation 
 
1 
 
   Independence 
 
2 
 
6 
 
   Election 
 
2 
 
   British Raj 
 
0 
 
7 
 
   Civil Society 
 
0 
 
   Free 
 
1 
 
8 
 
   Democratization 
 
0 
 
   History 
 
3 
 
9 
 
   Liberties 
 
2 
 
   Decolonization 
 
0 
 
10 
 
   Plural 
 
2 
 
   Empire 
 
0 
 
11 
 
   Constitution 
 
0 
 
   Gandhi 
 
0 
 
12 
 
   Vote 
 
1 
 
   Struggle 
 
0 
 
13 
 
   Equality 
 
1 
 
   Solidarity 
 
0 
 
14 
 
   Participation 
 
7 
 
   Movement 
 
0 
 
15 
 
   Values 
 
4 
 
   Imperial 
 
0 
 
16 
 
   Ideals 
 
0 
 
   Legacy 
 
0 
 
17 
 
   Electorate 
 
0 
 
   Sovereignty 
 
0 
 
18 
 
   Parliament 
 
2 
 
   Non-interference 
 
0 
 
19 
 
   Rights 
 
3 
 
   Historical 
 
0 
 
20 
 
   Republic 
 
1 
 
   Commonwealth 
 
0 
 
21 
 
   Secular 
 
0 
 
   Oppressed 
 
0 
 
22 
 
   Suffrage 
 
0 
 
   Ruled 
 
1 
 
23 
 
   Multi-party 
 
0 
 
   Territory 
 
0 
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24 
 
   Consensus 
 
0 
 
   Liberation 
 
0 
 
25 
 
   Justice 
 
0 
 
   Injustice 
 
0 
 
                TOTAL 
 
36 
 
   TOTAL 
 
8 
 
 
As the findings in Table 5.1c show, within official communication aimed at the Netherlands, 
India’s political identity as a democratic state is referenced a striking more than four times 
(thirty-six) as often as its political identity as a post-colonial state (eight). The usage of terms 
related to the democratic identity is reasonably balanced since fourteen out of the total possible 
twenty-five words/phrases find mention at least once, with the words “democracy” and 
“participation” being used most frequently. This can be interpreted as an attempt to convey 
India’s democracy as wholesome and not simply superficial. 
On the contrary, when it comes to the post-colonial identity, out of the possible twenty-five in 
total, merely five words are used. These are “colonial”, “independence”, “free”, “history”, and 
“ruled”, which can be argued as being general to all countries that underwent colonial rule, rather 
than being specific to India’s experience. A plausible reason is that India itself was not colonized 
by the Dutch, who held colonies elsewhere, and thus more generic references to colonialism are 
utilized for the Netherlands. 
 
Of the twelve official documents available for analysis in this case, there are three speeches, four 
press statements, and five press releases. With regard to the press releases, India’s democratic 
political identity is conveyed in just one instance, while its post-colonial identity is left out 
entirely. Even in the one instance where democracy was referenced, this was done in the broader 
context of shared values and economic interests.  
The speeches and press statements made by the Indian leaders to address Indo-Dutch relations 
are less formalistic and more elaborate. While diplomatic relations in recent history are included 
here, they mainly refer to trade relations. Shared political values emerge as a central theme 
within the speeches and statements, where pluralism, rule of law, and an independent judiciary 
are detailed as hallmarks of India’s commitment to democracy. It is striking to note that the 
speeches or press statements that occurred in a governmental context contain absolutely no 
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references to post-colonialism. This is in stark contrast to the observations made in the case of 
Indonesia and South Africa.  
Both Prime Ministers Singh and Modi addressed the Indian-origin diaspora in the Netherlands, in 
November 2004 and June 2017 respectively. In these addresses, the references to history are 
about the civilizational and cultural links to India, rather than a colonial past. On the other hand, 
democracy, public participation and India’s diverse society are invoked to convey the pluralistic 
essence of Indian democracy in practice. As an Indian diplomat based in The Hague explained 
(30 April 2018), diversity and pluralism are particularly useful in the approach towards the 
Netherlands because of its reputation as an inclusive society.  
Democratic values are also in focus when establishing similarity with the European Union (EU) 
and its ideals, which appears regularly in the communication aimed at the Netherlands. This is 
particularly true of the documents on the Indian Prime Minister’s official visit to The Hague in 
November 2004 for the India-EU Summit when the Netherlands held the Presidency of the 
European Council. Here, India and the EU were hailed as being natural partners, largely due to 
the shared democratic and liberal ideals. With the Netherlands, overall, the focus is on economic 
ties and cooperation over mutual international concerns such as sustainability, nuclear security 
and terrorism, and the political commonalities are highlighted as a way of softening the overall 
discourse and building a sense of similarity. Democracy is often used as political soft power 
“when we deal with advanced countries in the West; countries such as the Netherlands and 
others in Europe”, says an Indian diplomat in an interview, also mentioning “the rule of law and 
order” as a hallmark of the democratic system (30 April 2018). “It may not be overtly mentioned, 
but it’s there”, she states. 
 
It is very clear in the case of the Netherlands that when political identity comes into play, the 
communication of India’s democratic identity is given preference over its post-colonial identity. 
This can be discerned from the examination of the data collected through both qualitative content 
and discourse analysis methods. 
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d) India’s soft power strategies for THE UK 
 
The case of the UK yielded the most documents (twenty-nine in total), in terms of the official 
communication from the Government of India with regard to bilateral visits between the two 
states in the 21st century. The results obtained from the qualitative content analysis of these 
documents are presented in Table 5.1d. 
 
Table 5.1d: Frequency of Key Words and Phrases in the Data (29 documents) for India-UK relations 
 
No. 
 
INDIA’S DEMOCRATIC IDENTITY 
 
INDIA’S POST-COLONIAL IDENTITY 
 
Word/Phrase 
 
Frequency 
 
Word/Phrase 
 
Frequency 
 
1 
 
   Democratic 
 
6 
 
   Post-colonial 
 
1 
 
2 
 
   Rule of Law 
 
8 
 
   Colonial 
 
4 
 
3 
 
   Liberal 
 
5 
 
   Non-violence 
 
0 
 
4 
 
   Democracy 
 
17 
 
   Freedom 
 
9 
 
5 
 
   Representation 
 
3 
 
   Independence 
 
5 
 
6 
 
   Election 
 
5 
 
   British Raj 
 
2 
 
7 
 
   Civil Society 
 
2 
 
   Free 
 
6 
 
8 
 
   Democratization 
 
0 
 
   History 
 
13 
 
9 
 
   Liberties 
 
3 
 
   Decolonization 
 
0 
 
10 
 
   Plural 
 
12 
 
   Empire 
 
6 
 
11 
 
   Constitution 
 
15 
 
   Gandhi 
 
10 
 
12 
 
   Vote 
 
4 
 
   Struggle 
 
1 
 
13 
 
   Equality 
 
27 
 
   Solidarity 
 
3 
 
14 
 
   Participation 
 
3 
 
   Movement 
 
2 
 
15 
 
   Values 
 
9 
 
   Imperial 
 
1 
 
16 
 
   Ideals 
 
3 
 
   Legacy 
 
2 
 
17 
 
   Electorate 
 
3 
 
   Sovereignty 
 
1 
 
18 
 
   Parliament 
 
4 
 
   Non-interference 
 
0 
 
19 
 
   Rights 
 
16 
 
   Historical 
 
6 
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20 
 
   Republic 
 
3 
 
   Commonwealth 
 
5 
 
21 
 
   Secular 
 
2 
 
   Oppressed 
 
1 
 
22 
 
   Suffrage 
 
0 
 
   Ruled 
 
6 
 
23 
 
   Multi-party 
 
0 
 
   Territory 
 
0 
 
24 
 
   Consensus 
 
3 
 
   Liberation 
 
0 
 
25 
 
   Justice 
 
6 
 
   Injustice 
 
0 
 
                TOTAL 
 
159 
 
   TOTAL 
 
84 
 
 
The vast number of documents available for this case meant that a comprehensive analysis could 
be conducted. The high number of bilateral visits, and the resulting documents, between India 
and the UK are not surprising, given their historical ties that were shaped by around two 
centuries of British colonial rule over India, and their friendly relations after India’s 
independence in 1947. The findings presented in Table 5.1d clearly show that India’s political 
identity as a democracy is invoked much more (almost twice as much) than its post-colonial 
identity in its approach for the UK, with one hundred and fifty-nine words/phrases being used for 
the democratic identity compared to eighty-four for the post-colonial one. It is immediately 
noticeable that references to both are quite well-balanced within themselves, as twenty-two out 
of the possible twenty-five words/phrases linked to democracy are employed here and nineteen 
out of twenty-five are employed for post-colonialism.  
The references to India’s democratic identity see the terms “democracy”, “plural”, 
“Constitution”, “equality”, and “rights” appearing the most frequently, thus pointing to the 
importance of communicating the depth of Indian democracy. The allusions to “Parliament” and 
“rule of law”, in particular, are significant because India’s system of parliamentary democracy 
and many of its political ideals are inspired from the UK’s own political system, tenets of which 
were in place during the British colonial rule in India. Here, it is important to note that shared 
democratic features, which are mutually comprehensible, are attempted to be utilized as soft 
power by India. 
While amounting to almost half of the democratic references, the references to India’s post-
colonial identity are nonetheless significant because the number of connected words/phrases 
used (irrespective of their respective frequencies) is the same as that for South Africa and more 
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than that of Indonesia, both of which are post-colonial nations like India. Further, the highly 
frequent use of the terms “history” and “Gandhi”, along with the mentions of “empire”, “British 
Raj”, and “Commonwealth” demonstrates that India’s particular experiences as a former British 
colony continue to play a part in its contemporary approach towards its former colonial ruler. 
This observation is compounded by the fact that the usage of these specific terms (with the 
exception of “history”) was absent in its approach towards the Netherlands. So, even though the 
theme of post-colonialism is not dominant in official communication aimed towards the UK, it is 
still used in the pursuit of establishing familiarity as two nations that share an intertwined and 
complex colonial history. 
 
Of the twenty-nine official documents available for bilateral visits between India and the UK in 
the 21st century, twelve are speeches, while there are eight press statements, eight press releases, 
and one interview. Within the press releases, as expected from observations of the previous 
cases, the focus is on key areas of bilateral relations and details of the particular visit. But, a 
closer look reveals that though not explicitly stated, there are hints at their past colonial ties, seen 
in vague mentions of a relationship that has transformed over the years and the allusions to a 
shared history. Slight democratic references, such as those to parliamentary political exchanges 
are also present, though (again) not stated explicitly.  
The statements to the press comprise detailed descriptions of particular visits, mainly economic 
in nature, but also occasionally touch upon the political identities this research is concerned with. 
In the recent press statement by Prime Minister Modi during British Prime Minister Theresa 
May’s visit to India in November 2016, the ties between the two countries are hailed as being 
special, enduring, and unique (which points to their specific historic ties), and shared values are 
emphasized (which points to common democratic values). Interestingly, the statements which are 
made to the Indian media focus almost exclusively on national economic and security interests 
and the Indo-UK developments on those fronts. In contrast, the statements made by Indian 
leaders during visits to the UK are more descriptive on the nature of bilateral ties. Here, the 
familiarity lent by history and people-to-people ties, and shared democratic values, are discussed; 
the unique character of the world’s oldest and the largest parliamentary democracies sharing 
historic connections is mentioned.  
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The interview of Prime Minister Singh with The Times during his visit to the UK in September 
2004 brings up the colonial past as an inspiration for pursuing a democratic and equitable 
political system. This particular sentiment is echoed by many of the speeches and addresses by 
Indian leaders as well, perhaps in a bid to emphasize the pre-independence colonial roots of 
India’s post-independence democratic trajectory. This is also true of the transformation of the 
relationship from one of colonial subjugation to one of an equal partnership. Speeches made at 
business or technology-related summits are expectedly largely devoid of political references, but 
do refer to institutional familiarity. Democratic pluralism and how this connects the common 
peoples of the two nations is stressed in speeches addressed to the large Indian diaspora in the 
UK, with the ‘close understanding’ of each other’s political institutions being highlighted as an 
asset. The mutual importance accorded to basic freedoms and fundamental human rights is also 
mentioned, all with the aim of strengthening this sense of familiarity and connection. Nicolas 
Blarel, in an interview (4 May 2018), pointed to the importance of the diaspora in increasing 
India’s “visibility” that at times could translate into leverage in the politics of the UK. Speeches 
and press releases regarding India-EU summits under British Presidency of the Council feature 
strong endorsement of India and the EU as ‘natural partners’, where the foundations of a 
common belief in democracy, civil society, and consensus are viewed as leading the way for 
greater economic cooperation.  
Finally, it is the speeches made by Prime Minster Modi at the British Parliament in 2015, and 
those made by Prime Minister Singh at the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford in 2006 and 
2005 respectively that are truly elaborate in their discussion of the political dimensions of 
bilateral ties. They, thus, provide valuable fodder for the examination of India’s political identity 
as a soft power towards the UK. The speeches by the respective Prime Ministers from rival 
Indian political parties are almost a decade apart. Yet, each one of them begins with recollections 
of their long colonial history, the Indian movement for freedom, and inevitably, the role of 
Mahatma Gandhi, who studied law in London before going to South Africa, after which he 
returned to India. This emphasis on history at the very onset seems designed to forge a bond with 
the audience, and it later gives way to a more intricate detailing of India’s democratic and liberal 
achievements. While the speech at the Parliament is rather diplomatic, the ones at the universities 
are more open and frank. It seems that India’s colonial experiences are described not with the 
intent of invoking sympathy or guilt, but rather, demonstrating the ungrudging and forward-
57 
 
looking attitude of the Indian leadership after independence was achieved. The grievances 
against British colonial rule are laid out, but only to state that these did not deter India from 
seeking good relations with the UK, and this spirit of cooperation and partnership is credited to 
the ‘essence of democracy’. Here, colonial history and the resulting familiarity with British laws 
and political institutions are showcased as having an impact on India’s own democratic system. 
Further, the need for shared tackling of the contemporary dangers faced by inclusive democracy 
is mentioned.  
 
Overall, the nature of the approach towards the UK is particularly fascinating. Historical colonial 
experiences are freely referenced, often in great detail, but they are shown as paving the path for 
India’s democratic system. This is evident in an Indian diplomat’s assertion that “the relationship 
with Britain is no longer what it used to be and Britain itself is no longer what it used to be”, 
referring to the practical redundancy of post-colonialism here because India is no longer 
subordinate and the UK no longer holds a powerful empire (30 April 2018). To address mutual 
contemporary and future concerns, a shared democratic and secular worldview is portrayed as 
bolstering bilateral ties. So, though post-colonial references are sizable, they are generally 
surpassed by the emphasis on democracy.  
 
 
 
5.2     Discussion of the Results 
 
This section provides a discussion of the results presented and interpreted in the previous section. 
This is done in order to link the empirical evidence with the theoretical expectations and the 
hypotheses, which would allow us to address the research question of this thesis.  
 
An examination of the data shows that India’s political values and its identity as a post-colonial 
democracy are salient features of its overall appeal. Nicolas Blarel, in an interview (4 May 
2018), used the term “hybrid political entity” as India’s strong suit, to refer to its unique political 
character. He claims that “India is contributing … it has something to bring to the table, to the 
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international community”, which, he argues, sets India apart from its neighbour China even 
though India’s budgetary investments in this arena are nowhere near China’s. Though stating that 
soft power activities are “nothing new” and have existed since the times of India’s first Prime 
Minister Nehru, Blarel is of the opinion that, since the 1990s, there has been an increased 
acknowledgment of the potentials of soft power within institutional settings in India. His 
academic opinion was corroborated from the policy-making side as well, by an interview with an 
Indian diplomat (30 April 2018), who said that “In the last three years [before 2018], there has 
been more governmental focus on soft power than usual”, as she referred to the rising push for 
soft power under Prime Minister Modi’s administration. This adds to the relevance of conducting 
this study. 
 
The Netherlands and the UK were the erstwhile colonial power nations selected for the case 
study, and were analyzed in detail. The findings of the study demonstrate that for these nations 
with an uncomfortable past as colonial occupiers of foreign territories, democracy emerges as a 
unifying factor with India. This reflects the constructivist arguments described by Ted Hopf 
(1998) which state that a state’s behaviour towards another state is moderated by its 
understanding of the other state’s identity. In the case of the Netherlands, the focus on shared 
democratic values and ideals is extremely apparent, which is not surprising given the fact that the 
Netherlands was not India’s own colonial ruler. The results are not as clear-cut for the UK, 
because governmental communication from India routinely highlights their intertwined colonial 
histories and India’s freedom movement. The rhetoric of a “special relationship” that Brysk et al 
discussed in 2002 (p.267) is missing from India’s side, and Blarel also touched upon this by 
saying that it is the UK, rather than India, that pushes for the “special relationship” rhetoric, 
mainly in a bid to distinguish itself from other Western nations such as France which are trying 
to enter the Indian market (4 May 2018). However, from India’s side, though there are mentions 
of historic connections, these revolve around a transformed but enduring relationship. Even here, 
as observed in the previous section, India’s system of parliamentary democracy and its liberal 
commitments are showcased as being influenced by the British system, with institutional and 
legal familiarity sought to be conveyed. The interview with Blarel corroborates this, with his 
observation that many institutions of independent India “come from British India” (4 May 2018).  
While colonial-era ties are acknowledged, it is democracy which is shown to be the political 
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guide for the way forward. Based on these results, it is possible to state that sub-hypothesis 1 is 
confirmed, that is ‘if a state is an erstwhile colonial power nation, then India is likely to prioritize 
its political identity as a democratic state in its soft power strategy for that state’. 
 
A comprehensive examination of the cases of Indonesia and South Africa, through the methods 
of content and discourse analysis, shows that for these former colony nations, India considers its 
own post-colonial identity as a more substantial soft power asset than its identity as a democratic 
state. It is important to note here that Indonesia and South Africa are both democracies, which 
makes the fact that shared post-colonial ideals are nevertheless given preference, especially 
significant. The emphasis on post-colonialism here is in line with Himadeep Muppidi’s (2012) 
argument that democracy-related projects can be conceived as forms of neocolonial hegemony, 
which India would certainly look to avoid. Echoing this is an Indian diplomat who states that 
India doesn’t have “a policy of spreading democracy all over the world” (30 April 2018). Within 
post-colonial ideals, India and Indonesia’s leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement and for 
Asian-African solidarity, and India’s support for South Africa’s anti-colonial and anti-apartheid 
struggles, along with the immense legacy of Mahatma Gandhi, are particularly highlighted by the 
Government of India to forge a sense of shared experience, understanding, and common interests 
in the 21st century. Further, as stated by an Indian diplomat in an interview (25 April 2018), 
“state sovereignty plays a very important role in India’s political soft power, and India’s foreign 
policy has consistently followed this approach since its independence, particularly with the Non-
Aligned Movement”. Another diplomat narrows it down further by saying that post-colonialism 
“does play a part in India’s approach, but it depends on who you’re talking to”, pointing to 
targeted strategies (30 April 2018). These results enable the confirmation of sub-hypothesis 2, 
which states that ‘if a state is a former colony nation, then India is likely to prioritize its political 
identity as a post-colonial state in its soft power strategy for that state’. 
 
The confirmation of both sub-hypothesis 1 and 2 by the results of the case study implies that 
India’s usage of its political identity as a soft power resource is different for different target 
states; it is dependent on whether the other state is an erstwhile colonial power nation or a former 
colony nation. When asked about the dichotomy between ex-colonizers and ex-colonies being 
used in this thesis, an Indian diplomat (30 April 2018) termed it as “reasonable”, saying that the 
60 
 
two sub-hypotheses reflect the general approach of the Indian government. As a result, it can be 
asserted that the main hypothesis of this research is confirmed: the colonial history of a certain 
state shapes India’s use of its political identity as a democratic post-colonial state within its soft 
power strategy towards that state. This effectively answers the research question of this thesis. 
 
Further, the confirmation of the hypothesis lends support to the critical constructivist notions 
detailed by Ted Hopf (1998) focusing on alienation as a motivator for the search for state 
identity, and Rebecca Adler-Nissen’s argument (2016) about inequalities of dominance that 
influence a state’s self-perception, discussed in the chapter on the theoretical framework. The 
emphasis of post-colonial identity with other post-colonial nations demonstrates that historical 
political alienation from power over one’s own territory and the post-independence alienation 
from structures of global power have a crucial impact on the self-identity of these states. It also 
strengthens Manjari Miller’s (2013) assertion that India’s colonial past forms a key component 
of its national identity and that this influences its foreign policy decisions. Miller’s argument that 
post-colonial countries possess a “post-imperial ideology” (p.7) which leads them to pursue a 
more equitable international order is corroborated in the observations from the cases of Indonesia 
and South Africa. Here, India highlights shared calls for reforms in the structures of global 
governance, with such calls missing in the cases of the Netherlands and the UK. 
 
Additionally, an interesting aspect is the role of memberships or partnerships of significant 
international or regional multilateral platforms. As the analysis of the data has shown, in the case 
of the European nations, there was much focus on India’s present and potential relations with the 
EU. This was especially noticeable in the case of the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent with the 
UK. In Indonesia’s case, the importance of its ties with ASEAN was brought up by India, and the 
same was observed for South Africa, with common membership of the IBSA forum and the 
BRICS forum being stressed at times. These diplomatic linkages can be viewed as a way of 
highlighting common worldviews and shared stakes in certain policy outcomes, which motivates 
the two sides to strive for stronger ties and remain committed to agreements. The British 
Commonwealth was also discussed occasionally (but not strongly) in India’s communication for 
the UK and South Africa. That it was not stressed upon very highly perhaps implies that the 
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Commonwealth is not accorded particular significance by India in the 21st century, unlike the 
other platforms mentioned above.  
 
 
 
5.3     Limitations and Implications for further research 
 
The empirical evidence that emerged from the comparative case study has confirmed the main 
hypothesis as well as the two sub-hypotheses of this thesis, with regard to India’s soft power 
strategies for other states in the 21st century. However, this study is not bereft of limitations, and 
has certain drawbacks.  
 
The most challenging aspects with regard to the research design have been the paucity of time 
and the lack of financial resources, owing to which more cases could not be selected for 
observation. The case selection in this thesis carries with it the dangers of selection bias and a 
limited basis for external generalization. While two cases were considered per sub-hypothesis, 
the incorporation of more cases could have further reduced these risks by increasing the scope of 
representation of a larger population. The inclusion of more nations, especially non-
Commonwealth ones, would lend further credibility to the hypotheses, if confirmed again; this 
could be done in the future if this study is to be expanded. The qualitative nature of the study 
also meant that a small-N, rather than large-N, design was utilized. Furthermore, along with the 
time-related concerns, limitations of physical access also imply that additional elite interviews 
with diplomats and/or scholars could not be conducted by the researcher. 
 
This research focused specifically on India’s soft power strategies for individual states, and the 
highlighting of India’s political identity during visits to and from the selected states, for various 
purposes or events. At the same time, India is an active member of several multilateral regional 
and international forums, and expectedly exercises soft power within these platforms as well. Is 
political identity a factor here? How? The soft power role played by Indian political identity 
within forums such as the UN General Assembly, the WTO, the BRICS grouping, regional 
initiatives such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), etc. is, thus, 
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important to explore the overall salience of India’s political identity as its soft power. This can 
potentially be taken up in future research which focuses solely on India’s official communication 
during various multilateral meetings or summits. 
Further, as is evident from the cases of Indonesia, the Netherlands, and the UK, India’s soft 
power outreach towards important multi-national blocs such as ASEAN and the EU plays a role 
in its approach towards individual member-states of these blocs. The examination of political 
identity within soft power strategies for ASEAN and the EU, comparatively and/or as a single 
case study, hence, could also make up the focus of subsequent research. 
Another area for further study could be the role played by India’s possible self-identification as a 
great power or regional power in the use of its political identity as a soft power resource. This 
has not been explored by this research, which largely limited India’s self-identification to that of 
a democratic post-colonial state. 
 
Thus, though constrained by certain limitations, as stated above, this study offers suggestions for 
new spheres of research on India’s soft power, along with enriching the existing research. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Since very early in its existence as an independent nation, India’s soft power and in particular the 
power of ideas and values has formed a crucial aspect of its foreign policy, but the nation lacked 
the substantial hard power needed to bolster it. The last decade of the 20th century, the 1990s, 
brought with it an increase in India’s hard power, which lent greater potency to its soft power. In 
turn, soft power was also considered vital in ensuring that India’s hard power rise was not 
interpreted as being hostile. The governmental acknowledgement of this power of attraction and 
persuasion has been on the rise, gradually but surely, in the 21st century. Soft power activities 
have received immense impetus under the current administration of Prime Minister Modi, with 
its focus on public diplomacy. As a fellow major developing economy with a vast population, 
comparisons with China are but natural and are made in the context of soft power as well. While 
both nations have rich soft power assets linked to civilizational heritage, the appeal of political 
values and ideologies is more far-reaching in the case of India, largely due to the rare 
combination of democratic and post-colonial dimensions in its state identity, and its reputation as 
a benign and peaceful state. This thesis is rooted in the debates over soft power in international 
relations, with a specific focus on the political components of India’s soft power in the 
contemporary era. 
 
The primary objective of this research was to address the question of ‘How does India use its 
political identity within its soft power strategies for other states in the 21st century?’ The central 
argument proposed in response to this question was reflected in the primary hypothesis, i.e. the 
colonial history of a certain state shapes India’s use of its political identity as a democratic post-
colonial state within its soft power strategy towards that state.  This was followed by the 
introduction of two sub-hypotheses which were informed by a post-colonial dichotomy. One 
sub-hypothesis propounded that if a state is an erstwhile colonial power nation, then India is 
likely to prioritize its political identity as a democratic state in its soft power strategy for that 
state, and the other that if a state is a former colony nation, then India is likely to prioritize its 
political identity as a post-colonial state in its soft power strategy for that state. These hypotheses 
drew upon deductive reasoning based on the existing literature on the topic, and a theoretical 
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framework of critical constructivist and post-colonial conceptualizations of the interactions 
between state identity and foreign policy. 
 
The testing of the hypotheses relied on extensive research, which was conducted in the form of a 
comparative case study where Indonesia, South Africa, the Netherlands, and the UK were 
selected as the cases. Information obtained from eighty-one published sources of official 
communication from the Government of India, and four elite interviews with three diplomats and 
one scholar, was examined using the methods of qualitative content and discourse analysis. The 
results for each case were interpreted and discussed comprehensively, and then compared using 
the categories of erstwhile colonial power nations (the Netherlands and the UK) and former 
colony nations (Indonesia and South Africa). This analysis led to the confirmation or acceptance 
of the two sub-hypothesis, which in turn entailed the confirmation of the primary hypothesis and 
with it the central argument of this thesis. While contributing to the existing research, this study 
does have certain limitations, largely due to the limited time and resources available to the 
researcher. The acknowledgement of these limitations is valuable because it has raised additional 
possibilities and scope for further research on India’s soft power and the strategies to convey it.  
 
To conclude, this thesis found that political values and identity, particularly those linked to 
democracy and post-colonialism, play a role in India’s communication of its soft power. The 
hybrid nature of its political identity can be perceived as lending a unique and extremely wide-
ranging appeal to the South Asian country. India’s rise in the 21st century has led the nation to 
pursue soft power and public diplomacy with increased fervor, which manifests in targeted 
strategies for political soft power that are likely to invoke India’s democratic identity when 
communicating with former colonizers and its post-colonial identity for former colonies. If this 
approach evolves further, and in which manner this occurs, promises to be interesting and salient 
to follow, in both academic and practical senses.  
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Appendix 3 
 
Elite Interviews: Interview Protocol  
 
QUESTIONS (Semi-structured interview) 
 
1. In recent years, several scholars and Indian foreign policy analysts have argued that there 
has been increased governmental focus on India’s soft power. Would you agree with this? 
Why? 
 
2. While culture has been a primary aspect of India’s global appeal, do you think political 
values form a soft power source for India? 
      Follow-up: Which political ideals or institutions would you argue are the key 
components of India’s political identity?  
 
3. Would you argue that India uses its identity as a democracy within its exercise of soft 
power? How does it do so? 
Follow-up: Is this democratic identity (or narrative of a democratic society based on 
the rule of law) employed by India universally within its bilateral relations, i.e., with 
all other states? Why / why not? 
 
4. Do post-colonial ideals such as solidarity with other former colonies and emphasis on 
state sovereignty also play a part in India’s political soft power? 
Follow-up: How does India stress this post-colonial identity as a soft power within 
bilateral relations with other states?  
 
5. Does India prioritize certain political values and identities within dealings with other 
individual states? 
Follow-up: Is there a difference in India’s soft power approach for states which were 
historical colonizers and those that were historically colonized? How? Which political 
values would India emphasize in each case? 
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